Misclassification and Antidiscrimination: An Empirical Analysis by Alexander, Charlotte S.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2017
Misclassification and Antidiscrimination: An
Empirical Analysis
Charlotte S. Alexander
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alexander, Charlotte S., "Misclassification and Antidiscrimination: An Empirical Analysis" (2017). Minnesota Law Review. 151.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/151
  
 
907 
Article 
Misclassification and Antidiscrimination: 
An Empirical Analysis 
Charlotte S. Alexander† 
  INTRODUCTION   
“Misclassification” refers to employers’ practice of classify-
ing workers as independent contractors whom the law would 
categorize as employees.1 These workers are controlled by and 
economically dependent on a single employer, and lack the flex-
ibility, entrepreneurial opportunity, and autonomy of true in-
dependent contractors.2 By virtue of their contractor status, 
 
†  Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Robinson College of Business, 
Georgia State University; secondary appointment, Georgia State University 
College of Law. Thanks to Alejandro del Valle, Kate Griffith, Nathaniel Grow, 
Michael Harper, Joni Hersch, Barry Hirsch, Stephen Shore, Julia Tomassetti, 
and Noah Zatz for their helpful feedback and to Misha Cohen and Iliana 
Dobrev for their excellent work as case coders. Thanks also to the participants 
in the Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law at Indiana 
University Bloomington, the University of Georgia Terry College of Business 
Legal Studies faculty seminar, and to the anonymous reviewers of earlier 
drafts of this work from the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies and the 
Academy of Legal Studies in Business. Copyright © 2017 by Charlotte S. Alex-
ander. 
 1. Workers may also be misclassified as interns, trainees, volunteers, 
partners, shareholders, and/or member-owners of limited liability companies. 
See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) 
(discussing shareholders as employees); Paul Johnson Drywall Inc. Agrees To 
Pay $600,000 in Back Wages, Damages and Penalties Following U.S. Labor 
Dep’t Investigation, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (May 19, 2014), https://www.dol.gov/ 
opa/media/press/whd/WHD20140827 (discussing LLC members as employees); 
infra note 61 (discussing cases concerning interns, trainees, and volunteers). 
 2. Part III.B.1 discusses the legal tests that courts use to determine a 
worker’s true employment status, including considering employer control and 
economic dependence. In the legal literature, the archetypal example of a true 
independent contractor is the self-employed plumber. See, e.g., Richard R. 
Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How 
It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 340 (2001) (“A 
plumber, for example, might be a contractor if installing good plumbing is a 
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misclassified workers have few workplace rights, as nearly all 
federal labor and employment statutes apply exclusively to em-
ployees and not to independent contractors.3 This means that, 
in most circumstances, employers are free to reject workers for 
jobs, fire them, and otherwise discriminate on the basis of sex, 
religion, or disability, for example, and to be absolutely explicit 
about their reasons for doing so, as long as those workers are 
classified as independent contractors. 
Courts, however, are meant to act as a check on employers’ 
classification power. Despite their status, misclassified workers 
may file suit alleging violations of their workplace rights and 
seek reclassification for purposes of the litigation.4 High profile 
 
discrete end the parties seek to achieve, and where the owner or general con-
tractor wishes to have no involvement in the details of the plumbing.”). A vivid 
example of misclassified workers, on the other hand, may be found in Heath v. 
Perdue Farms, Inc., where workers who were previously classified as employ-
ees arrived at their jobs only to find that they had been summarily reclassified 
as independent contractors, with little to no change in their job duties, pay 
structure, or any other term or condition of work. 87 F. Supp. 2d 452, 460–61 
(2000) (“Prior to January 1, 1991, Perdue readily acknowledged that its crew 
leaders and chicken catchers were employees. In 1991, Perdue made an at-
tempt to create a new system under which the crew leaders could be deemed 
independent contractors. In reality, however, nothing of substance changed in 
the manner in which Perdue related to its live haul crews except the manner 
in which they were paid.”). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires all people to receive the same treatment as 
white citizens in contracting, and so has been used by some contracted work-
ers to pursue race and national origin discrimination claims. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981(a) (2012); see also Danielle Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to Con-
tract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contrac-
tor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 184–85 (2006) (explaining § 1981’s coverage 
of contracted workers). Otherwise, independent contractors are barred from 
bringing claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (2012), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2012), 
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012), and the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2012). Contractors also fall outside the 
coverage of other federal statutes that provide rights on the job: the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012) (protecting workers’ rights to or-
ganize, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activity), the Occupation-
al Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652 (2012) (protecting workers’ rights to 
a safe workplace), the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (guar-
anteeing the minimum wage and overtime pay), and the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2012) (providing workers with leave time for self-
care and care of others). See generally Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, 
Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case for Amending Federal Employment 
Discrimination Laws To Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 
239–40 (1997) (describing the exclusion of independent contractors from cov-
erage of federal antidiscrimination laws, with the single exception of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981). 
 4. Notably, the misclassification question is a threshold inquiry in the 
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class actions against FedEx, Uber, and Amazon, for example, 
have asserted overtime and other pay claims in connection with 
those companies’ use of independent contractors.5 This litiga-
tion has received significant public and academic attention, fo-
cused primarily on misclassification’s implications for wage and 
hour law in the new “gig,” “sharing,” or “on-demand” economy.6 
Less attention has been paid to the connections between 
misclassification and antidiscrimination.7 Reams have been 
written about the weakening and narrowing of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)—the central federal antidis-
crimination law—as courts have erected procedural and sub-
stantive barriers to plaintiff success.8 Yet an antidiscrimination 
 
underlying substantive labor or employment law case, not a cause of action in 
and of itself. The act of misclassification does not constitute a violation of fed-
eral employment law, at least as currently interpreted by the U.S. Department 
of Labor. However, some scholars disagree. See, e.g., Catherine K. Ruckel-
shaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 378 (2008) (“[T]he cur-
rent [Wage and Hour Division] administrator has stated on several occasions 
that it is not a violation of any of the laws enforced by the WHD to misclassify 
workers as independent contractors. This is false, as the [Department of La-
bor] can and should investigate any complaints by workers claiming unpaid 
wages, whether or not they are called independent contractors.”). However, 
the act of misclassification in and of itself does violate some state laws. See 
Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm 
of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 120–28 (2009) (dis-
cussing state laws that penalize the act of misclassification). 
 5. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th 
Cir. 2014); Second Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand, 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-3826-EMC, 2014 WL 7912596 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 16, 2013); see also Greg Bensinger, Amazon Faces Lawsuit over 
Whether Delivery Workers Are Employees, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2015), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-faces-lawsuit-over-whether-delivery-workers 
-are-employees-1445989623. 
 6. See, e.g., Elizabeth Tippett, Using Contract Terms To Detect Underly-
ing Litigation Risk: An Initial Proof of Concept, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 549 
(2016) (discussing implications of misclassification litigation for the “sharing 
economy”); Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: FedEx Drivers and 
the Work Contract as Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1083 
(2015) (analyzing FedEx litigation in depth and investigating its implications 
for labor and wage-and-hour law); Kevin Roose, Does Silicon Valley Have a 
Contract-Worker Problem?, N.Y. MAG (Sept. 18, 2014), http://nymag.com/daily/ 
intelligencer/2014/09/silicon-valleys-contract-worker-problem.html (investigat-
ing misclassification of workers by “on-demand” companies such as Homejoy 
and Uber). 
 7. The only scholarly article that addresses the connections between mis-
classification and discrimination directly is decades old. See Nancy E. Dowd, 
The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 75 (1984) (arguing that courts should cease using the common 
law test for employee status in Title VII cases). 
 8. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and Floodgates, 
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law’s effectiveness depends not only on the strength of the doc-
trine, but also on its ability to reach the workers whom the law 
is intended to protect. In this view, the misclassification ques-
tion is key to the antidiscrimination project, as employers may 
use their classification power to write workers out of the law, 
and workers who cannot win a misclassification challenge in 
court cannot gain access to Title VII rights. However, little is 
known about the extent to which misclassification affects 
groups of workers who are also at high risk for employment 
discrimination. Nor do we have data on the outcomes of mis-
classification challenges in Title VII cases. In other words, we 
do not know the extent to which misclassification is pulling 
workers out of Title VII’s coverage, and the extent to which the 
courts are pulling them back in. 
Accordingly, this Article investigates misclassification and 
antidiscrimination. The Article makes two novel empirical con-
tributions. First, the Article combines previous research in la-
bor economics with data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics to investigate misclassification’s occupational and 
demographic distribution. This analysis finds that women 
and/or people of color are overrepresented in seven of the eight 
occupations at highest risk for misclassification, suggesting 
that misclassification may be removing Title VII protection 
from workers who most need antidiscrimination rights. 
Second, the Article presents the results of an original em-
pirical study of all federal court decisions available on Westlaw 
from 2005 to 2014 in which workers made misclassification ar-
guments in Title VII cases. The Article examines which work-
ers made misclassification challenges, which won, and why. 
Here, the Article concludes that courts may not be adequately 
 
10 STAN. C.R. & C.L. 223, 247–49 (2014) (summarizing barriers to Title VII 
plaintiffs). There is also an extensive body of empirical literature on the poor 
chances of Title VII plaintiffs in federal courts. See Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: 
From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 132 (2009); Kevin M. Cler-
mont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare 
in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004); John J. Donohue III 
& Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Liti-
gation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991); John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, 
The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law in the 1990s: A Preliminary 
Empirical Investigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RE-
SEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 261 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson 
eds., 2005); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal 
Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights 
United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2010). 
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performing their backstopping function in misclassification 
cases, both because the workers who are most at risk for mis-
classification and discrimination do not appear to be filing suit, 
and because courts’ processing of misclassification challenges 
can be deeply flawed. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes misclassi-
fication’s history and scope and presents data on the character-
istics of misclassified workers and their coverage by Title VII. 
Part II describes the methodology used in coding courts’ Title 
VII misclassification decisions and provides descriptive statis-
tics summarizing the coding results. Part III sketches out three 
theories—legal formalism, contractual formalism, and critical 
realism—that might predict the outcome of plaintiffs’ misclassi-
fication challenges, and then presents regression results that 
identify the variables associated with plaintiffs’ misclassifica-
tion wins. Part IV discusses the implications of these results. 
Part V concludes. 
I.  MISCLASSIFICATION AND TITLE VII   
A. MISCLASSIFICATION’S HISTORY AND SCOPE 
David Weil, Administrator of the U.S. Department of La-
bor’s Wage and Hour Division, describes misclassification as 
the outgrowth—and perversion—of companies’ attempts to 
shed employees whose work falls outside the core competency 
of the business.9 As Weil explains it, since the late 1970s, pres-
sure from “investors, lenders, and capital markets” has pushed 
companies “to focus their attention on those activities that add-
ed greatest value (such as product design, product innovation, 
cost or quality efficiencies, or other unique strengths) while 
farming out work to other organizations not central to their 
core mission.”10 Advances in technology and communication 
then enable lead companies to direct, monitor, and oversee the 
work they have shed through the contracting process.11 Over 
time, companies’ labor outsourcing has only increased, and “in-
dependent contracting [has] popped up in places that previous-
ly would have been regarded as traditional employment situa-
 
 9. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD 
FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 10–11 (2014). 
 10. Id. at 11. 
 11. Id. at 44 (“[T]echnological changes created new ways of designing and 
monitoring the work of other parties, inside or outside the corporation.”). 
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tions.”12 Many of these newly minted independent contractors 
are misclassified, bearing little resemblance to the “business 
entities in their own right” that would properly be exempt from 
antidiscrimination and other employment laws.13 Nevertheless, 
misclassification has proven a profitable and relatively low-risk 
strategy for companies in an environment of vague legal stand-
ards and lax enforcement.14 
Today, much of the research on misclassification uses sur-
veys and audits to estimate lost federal and state tax revenues 
when misclassified workers fail to pay the correct taxes on their 
income. If those workers had been properly classified as em-
ployees, the thinking goes, then their employers would have 
withheld taxes throughout the year, preventing underpayment 
by the workers themselves at tax time.15 At least eleven 
states,16 three federal agencies,17 unions,18 journalists,19 and ad-
 
 12. Id. at 24. 
 13. Id. at 21. 
 14. As the U.S. Supreme Court has put it, the task of distinguishing be-
tween employees and independent contractors “depends upon criteria often 
subtle and uncertain of application.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 82 (1932); 
see also RICHARD J. REIBSTEIN ET AL., PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, THE 2015 
WHITE PAPER ON INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION: HOW COM-
PANIES CAN MINIMIZE THE RISKS (2015), http://www.pepperlaw.com/ 
publications/the-2015-white-paper-on-independent-contractor 
-misclassification-how-companies-can-minimize-the-risks-2015-04-27 (“The 
use and misuse of independent contractors has increased dramatically over 
the last two decades. This has been due, in large part, to the combination of 
two factors: (1) economic and other business advantages derived from the use 
of 1099ers and (2) lax regulatory enforcement—a classic risk/reward calcu-
lus.”). 
 15. See Mandy Locke & Franco Ordoñez, Why Is Worker Misclassification 
a Problem?, STAR-TELEGRAM (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.star-telegram.com/ 
news/special-reports/article3871866.html (“The company acts as a tax collector 
of sorts. Before employees pick up their paychecks each week, the company 
siphons off the pieces of it that Uncle Sam demands in taxes. The practice 
works. The IRS says it collects 99 percent of what it’s owed from employees on 
the payrolls of companies. Workers treated as contractors, on the other hand, 
often elude tax collection.”). 
 16. MICHAEL P. KELSAY ET AL., DEP’T OF ECON. UNIV. OF MISSOURI-
KANSAS CITY, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE 
STATE OF ILLINOIS 3 (2006), http://www.faircontracting.org/PDFs/prevailing_ 
wages/Illinois_Misclassification_Study.pdf (summarizing results of studies 
conducted in eleven states). 
 17. LALITH DE SILVA ET AL., PLANMATICS, INC., INDEPENDENT CONTRAC-
TORS: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PRO-
GRAMS (2000), https://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/00-5/00-5.pdf (prepared for the 
U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration); U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-717, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION: 
IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING COULD BETTER EN-
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vocacy groups20 have conducted such studies, finding in New 
Jersey, for example, that “38 percent of employers were . . . 
misclassifying their workers and much, much higher rates of 
misclassification [were] found in certain industries,” particular-
ly in construction.21 Another report found misclassification 
rates of between thirteen and twenty-three percent in indus-
tries across eleven states, producing tax losses in the tens and 
hundreds of millions per state.22 Likewise, according to U.S. 
Government Accountability Office estimates, the last time the 
Internal Revenue Service conducted a comprehensive misclassi-
fication estimate, “the federal government lost out on $2.72 bil-
lion in Social Security, unemployment, and income taxes be-
cause of employee misclassification.”23 
 
SURE DETECTION AND PREVENTION (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/ 
293679.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, WHILE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN 
TO ADDRESS WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION, AN AGENCY-WIDE EMPLOYMENT 
TAX PROGRAM AND BETTER DATA ARE NEEDED (2009), https://www.treasury 
.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/200930035fr.pdf. 
 18. See, e.g., DEP’T FOR PROF’L EMPS., MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES 
AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS: FACT SHEET 2016, http://dpeaflcio.org/wp 
-content/uploads/Misclassification-of-employees-2016.pdf. 
 19. See, e.g., Jones Fitzgerald, Wage Theft: How Two States Are Fighting 
Against Companies That Categorize Employees as Independent Contractors, 
PAC. STANDARD (Sept. 11, 2014), https://psmag.com/wage-theft-how-two-states 
-are-fighting-against-companies-that-categorize-employees-as-independent 
-abd474d362e7#.k87t06ilc; Misclassified: Contract To Cheat, MCCLATCHY DC, 
http://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/features/Contract-to-cheat. 
 20. See, e.g., SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, INDEPEND-
ENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND 
FEDERAL AND STATE TREASURIES (2012), http://nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/ 
03/IndependentContractorCosts1.pdf. 
 21. The Misclassification of Workers as Independent Contractors: What 
Policies and Practices Best Protect Workers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health, Emp’t, Labor & Pensions and the Subcomm. on Workforce Prots. of the 
H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong. 49–50 (2007) (statement of David 
Socolow, Comm’r, New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Develop-
ment). 
 22. KELSAY ET AL., supra note 16; see also Employee Misclassification, 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and 
-employment/employee-misclassification-resources.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 
2016) (summarizing state studies’ findings, including $125 million lost tax 
revenues in Illinois in the years 2001 to 2005 and $50 million in annual losses 
in Rhode Island). 
 23. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-656, EMPLOYMENT AR-
RANGEMENTS: IMPROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER 
CLASSIFICATION 2 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06656.pdf. These tax 
losses explain, in part, employers’ motivation to misclassify: “It’s estimated 
that a business can save 30 percent of their labor costs by using independent 
contractors rather than employees. . . . That provides a real incentive for busi-
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Yet apart from these tax loss studies, as labor scholar An-
nette Bernhardt puts it, “we have very little data” on the char-
acteristics of misclassified workers themselves, and no data at 
all on the connections between misclassification and Title VII.24 
The difficulty is that misclassification is a form of “disguised 
work,” an employment arrangement that is hard for research-
ers to identify because the worker’s true status is obscured.25 
The Sections that follow begin to fill in those blanks, draw-
ing on what little data there is to paint a portrait of the mis-
classified worker and his or her coverage by Title VII. As Fig-
ure 1 illustrates, the task is to identify those workers who are 
misclassified, those who are likely to bring Title VII claims, and 
then estimate the overlap between the two. In this way, we can 
make our best guess about the workers who are both at high 
risk for misclassification and for discrimination, thus needing, 
but lacking, Title VII coverage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nesses to classify their workers as independent contractors, even if the work-
ers are truly employees. While not always a deliberate attempt to flout the 
law, such savings allow a business to gain a competitive edge over other busi-
nesses.” NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 22. 
 24. Annette Bernhardt, Labor Standards and the Reorganization of Work: 
Gaps in Data and Research 7 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t, Working 
Paper No. 100-14, 2014), http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/100-14 
.pdf. In response to the paucity of data on misclassification, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor has launched a huge data-gathering initiative described at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification. States have also launched 
their own misclassification initiatives. See, e.g., LINDA H. DONAHUE ET AL., 
THE COST OF WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (Cornell 
Univ. ILR Sch. ed. 2007), http://www.digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=reports (describing New York’s initia-
tive). 
 25. Int’l Labour Org. [ILC], International Labour Conference, The Scope 
of the Employment Relationship, Report V, at 24–25 (2003), http://www.ilo.org/ 
public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc91/pdf/rep-v.pdf (“A disguised employment 
relationship is one which is lent an appearance that is different from the un-
derlying reality, with the intention of nullifying or attenuating the protection 
afforded by the law. It is thus an attempt to conceal or distort the employment 
relationship, either by cloaking it in another legal guise or by giving it another 
form in which the worker enjoys less protection.”). 
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Figure 1: Overlap Between Misclassified Workers and 
Potential Title VII Plaintiffs 
B. IDENTIFYING MISCLASSIFIED WORKERS 
In a line of research that is little known in legal scholar-
ship, labor economists have attempted to identify misclassified 
workers by exploiting inconsistencies between two sets of fed-
eral records: individual workers’ self-reported wage and salary 
earnings from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population 
Survey (CPS), and employers’ reports of those same workers’ 
earnings from the Social Security Administration’s Detailed 
Earnings Records (DER).26 The CPS is a monthly survey of 
workers that collects a variety of labor force statistics, includ-
ing earnings.27 The DER assembles employers’ records of work-
ers’ earnings and their tax classification as employees or inde-
pendent contractors.28 For a properly classified employee, the 
CPS and DER earnings figures should match: the worker re-
ports his or her wage and salary income—earned as an employ-
ee—on the CPS, and the employer reports that same income—
 
 26. MARC ROEMER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TP-2002-22, USING ADMINIS-
TRATIVE EARNINGS RECORDS TO ASSESS WAGE DATA QUALITY IN THE MARCH 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY AND THE SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM 
PARTICIPATION 1 (2002), http://www2.census.gov/ces/tp/tp-2002-22.pdf (de-
scribing data sets). 
 27. About the Current Population Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 30, 
2015), http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/about.html. 
 28. Christopher R. Bollinger et al., Trouble in the Tails? Earnings Nonre-
sponse and Response Bias Across the Distribution 2 (Aug. 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (“Access to the DER is advantageous as it 
affords the opportunity to fill in missing earnings for nonrespondents [to other 
surveys], and to compare survey responses to administrative tax records for 
respondents.”). 
 
Potential 
Title VII 
plaintiffs 
Misclassified 
workers 
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with the “employee” tax designation—in the DER. Mismatches, 
with the worker reporting dollars earned as an employee (or so 
the worker thought), and the employer reporting only inde-
pendent contractor earnings, signal a possible misclassifica-
tion.29 Table 1 illustrates this mismatch. 
Table 1: CPS and DER Income Reporting and Implica-
tions for Employment Status 
“Employee”  
Income Reported: 
CPS 
“Employee” 
Income Reported: 
DER
Implication For Employment Status 
Yes Yes Probably not misclassified 
Yes No Possibly misclassified as an  independent contractor 
No Yes 
Possibly misclassified as an  
employee30 
No No Probably not misclassified 
 
It is important to note that misclassification rates gleaned 
from CPS-DER mismatches are not the result of a third party’s 
 
 29. Id. at 9 (“[W]orkers may report . . . that they received wage and salary 
earnings, while the company from which they received pay instead reports it 
to IRS as self-employment earnings. The employer for tax purposes treats 
them as non-employees . . . and reports earnings on a 1099-MISC in Box 7 
(‘Nonemployee compensation’) rather than a W-2.”). A CPS-DER mismatch 
may also be evidence that workers were paid “off-the-books,” i.e., that they 
were considered employees by their employers but were paid in such a way as 
to avoid tax reporting requirements. Id. at 8. The CPS-DER comparison meth-
od does not distinguish between mismatches caused by misclassification and 
those caused by off-the-books payment arrangements. Id. at 14; see also 
Katharine G. Abraham et al., Exploring Differences in Employment Between 
Household and Establishment Data, 31 J. LABOR ECON. S129, S133 (2013) 
(discussing differences between off-the-books and misclassified workers). 
However, some scholars view off-the-books and misclassified workers as one 
and the same. See, e.g., Payroll Fraud: Targeting Bad Actors Hurting Workers 
and Businesses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pen-
sions and the Subcomm. on Emp’t & Workplace Safety, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) 
[hereinafter Payroll Fraud Hearing] (statement of Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, 
National Employment Law Project) (“These [off-the-books] workers are de fac-
to misclassified independent contractors, because the employers do not with-
hold and report taxes or comply with other basic workplace rules.”). 
 30. This version of “misclassification” differs from the version that is the 
focus of this Article, as the worker views him or herself as an independent con-
tractor and the employer views him or her as an employee. This circumstance 
might arise where an employer attempts to claim intellectual property created 
by a worker, for example. Thanks to Julia Tomassetti for this insight. 
  
2017] MISCLASSIFICATION 917 
 
independent assessment of any given work arrangement, such 
as the analysis a court would perform at the threshold of a Title 
VII case.31 What CPS-DER comparisons measure is a mismatch 
between the perceptions of the parties to the employment rela-
tionship: the worker’s belief that her income derives from work 
performed as an employee versus the employer’s belief that the 
same income derives from an independent contractor relation-
ship. Indeed, CPS-DER mismatch findings might be over-
inclusive, in that a worker who believes that she is an inde-
pendent contractor—because she receives a 1099 non-employee 
earnings form at tax time, for example—might still report her 
earnings as “employee” income on the CPS, due to a misunder-
standing of the CPS questions. Such a result would generate a 
“false positive” CPR-DER mismatch. 
Mismatch findings from CPS-DER comparisons might also 
be under-inclusive, because they draw data only from workers 
with a Social Security number,32 thereby omitting many undoc-
umented workers who might be subject to misclassification. 
Given that undocumented workers tend to hold jobs at the low 
end of the labor market, the CPS-DER mismatch findings may 
therefore skew toward higher-paid, higher-skilled occupations 
and omit undocumented workers entirely.33 
Nevertheless, despite the limitations of the data, CPS-DER 
mismatch findings begin to sketch a picture of the occupational 
distribution of misclassification. By mining CPS and DER 
mismatches, it is possible to identify both the occupations that 
appear to be most at risk for misclassification—i.e., the ones in 
which the largest percentages of workers are misclassified—
and those that contribute the most misclassified workers to the 
workforce—i.e., those in which the largest absolute numbers of 
workers are misclassified. A 2002 U.S. Census Bureau tech-
nical paper by Marc Roemer provides the most recent available 
analysis of both measures of misclassification.34 
 
 31. For a discussion of courts’ misclassification analyses, see infra Part 
III.B.1. 
 32. ROEMER, supra note 26, at 8. 
 33. See generally Madeline Zavodny, Do Immigrants Work in Worse Jobs 
than U.S. Natives? Evidence from California, 54 INDUS. REL. 276 (2015) (using 
California as a case study to show immigrant employment statistics). 
 34. ROEMER, supra note 26, at 8. In addition to the self-reporting issue 
identified above, the present application of the Roemer research is limited 
somewhat by its age, as it draws on mismatches gleaned from data from 1991, 
1994, and 1997. Because many scholars believe that misclassification has 
spread to new occupations in recent years, see, e.g., WEIL, supra note 9, at 24, 
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Roemer uses CPS-DER mismatches to generate a list, re-
produced with some modifications in Table 5 in the Appendix, 
of the forty occupations in which mismatches occurred with a 
likelihood ratio of at least one percent.35 Figures 2 and 3 below 
show, respectively, the fifteen occupations in which ten percent 
or more workers were misclassified, and the top fifteen occupa-
tions by absolute number of misclassified workers.36 
Figure 2: Occupations with Ten Percent or More Work-
ers Misclassified 
 
 
 
 
the Roemer list does not perfectly describe today’s misclassified workforce. 
Nevertheless, it represents our best guess as to the occupation profiles of mis-
classified workers. 
 35. The original version of this table appears in ROEMER, supra note 26, 
app. A, tbl.10. The version in Table 5 in the appendix has been modified as fol-
lows. Instead of reporting likelihood ratios, which are difficult to reverse-
engineer from Roemer’s table without access to the underlying data, Table 5 
reports percentages calculated from the figures reported in Roemer’s table. 
Table 5 also converts the occupation names listed in Roemer to their closest 
equivalent among the standardized occupations used in U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics data. 
 36. The ten percent cutoff is employed in order to produce a manageable 
subset of high-misclassification occupations, as is the display of the top fifteen 
occupations by absolute number of workers. 
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Figure 3: Top Fifteen Occupations by Number of Mis-
classified Workers37 
As Figure 2 shows, those workers most at risk for misclas-
sification were real estate brokers and sales agents, roughly 
forty-four percent of whom appear to be misclassified. Figure 3 
also lists real estate brokers and sales agents as the top occu-
pation in terms of the absolute number of misclassified work-
ers. Seven other occupations also appeared on both lists: clergy; 
lawyers; judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers; hair-
dressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists; maids and house-
keeping cleaners; teacher assistants; and door-to-door sales 
workers, news and street vendors, and related workers. Taken 
together, these eight high misclassification occupations account 
for approximately 1.6 million workers, or just over one percent 
of employed persons sixteen years and older in the 2014 work-
force.38 They are the occupations that Roemer’s work suggests 
are most at risk for misclassification and the greatest contribu-
 
 37. ROEMER, supra note 26. 
 38. The total number of employed workers in 2014 was 146,305,000; the 
total number of misclassified workers in the eight occupations, per Roemer, 
was 1,569,000, or 1.07 percent of the employed population. Labor Force Statis-
tics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU LAB. STATS., http://www.bls 
.gov/web/empsit/cps_charts.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Labor 
Force Statistics]; ROEMER, supra note 26, at app. A, tbl.10. 
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tors to the overall number of misclassified workers in the labor 
force. 
A full explanation of why different occupations have par-
ticular misclassification rates is outside the scope of this Arti-
cle, though Roemer does suggest reasons for some occupations’ 
presence on his list: 
There may be accounting idiosyncrasies at work here. Commissions 
from real estate sales may follow peculiar accounting conventions, al-
lowing workers to opt out of the Social Security system [thereby gen-
erating a CPS-DER mismatch]. Tax law can consider the clergy self-
employed, although in the . . . CPS context they clearly work for wag-
es because they have an employer and don’t own a business.39 
For purposes of this Article, the reason that a worker is mis-
classified is irrelevant. Whether misclassification is the result 
of innocent accounting idiosyncrasies or employer malfeasance, 
the impact on the worker’s antidiscrimination rights is the 
same: Title VII does not apply, unless the worker can prove 
otherwise in court.40 
Thus, the Roemer list begins to fill in the left-hand circle in 
the Venn diagram shown above in Figure 1. The next tasks, 
then, are to identify those workers who are most likely to be-
come Title VII plaintiffs, and then to determine the extent to 
which the two categories overlap. 
C. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL TITLE VII PLAINTIFFS 
Potential Title VII plaintiffs must satisfy two threshold re-
quirements: (1) they must be employed, as an employee, by a 
covered employer, defined as one that employs at least fifteen 
employees;41 and (2) they must have experienced discrimination 
on the basis of their membership in one of the five protected 
classes: race, sex, religion, national origin, and color.42 With re-
spect to the first requirement, according to some estimates, ap-
proximately sixteen percent of employees work for firms small 
enough to escape the statute’s coverage, leaving an estimated 
eighty-four percent of U.S. employees covered.43 
 
 39. ROEMER, supra note 26, at 14–15. 
 40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964) (prohibiting employers’ discriminato-
ry employment practices). 
 41. Id. § 2000e(b). 
 42. Id. § 2000e-2. 
 43. Brian Headd, The Characteristics of Small-Business Employees, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 2000, at 13–14, http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2000/ 
04/art3full.pdf. 
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With respect to the second requirement, there are no sta-
tistics that definitively identify the workers who face employ-
ment discrimination most frequently. However, statistics from 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) tell 
us which types of discrimination charges are filed most fre-
quently, a rough proxy for the types of discrimination that ac-
tually occur.44 From 1997 through 2014, the most frequently 
filed discrimination charge type was race, followed by sex.45 
And though the EEOC’s publicly available data do not report 
the specific types of sex and race discrimination at issue, as 
Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, and Ryon Lancaster 
have observed, “[w]hile anti-discrimination law protects every-
one, it largely is employed by members of traditionally disad-
vantaged groups . . . .”46 For example, in some surveys, 
“[a]lmost one-third of African Americans report that they expe-
rienced discriminatory treatment in the last year at least once, 
compared to a much smaller percentage of white workers.”47 
Likewise, women report sex discrimination and harassment at 
a rate that is dramatically higher than men.48 
Thus, in filling in the right-hand circle in the Venn dia-
gram in Figure 1, as a technical matter, all employees em-
ployed by covered employers, regardless of their particular 
race, sex, national origin, color, or religion—approximately 
 
 44. All workers seeking to assert a claim under Title VII and other federal 
antidiscrimination statutes must first file a discrimination charge with the 
federal EEOC or its state equivalent. Filing a Charge of Discrimination, 
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). 
 45. Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, EEOC, https://www.eeoc 
.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). 
 46. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 177. 
 47. Id. (citing K.A. DIXON ET AL., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: HOW 
AMERICANS VIEW DISCRIMINATION AND RACE ON THE JOB 11 (John J. Heldrich 
Ctr. for Workforce Dev., Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J. eds., 2002), http://www 
.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/products/uploads/A_Workplace_ 
Divided.pdf). Moreover, field experiments testing the rate at which potential 
employers selected job applicants for further interviews have shown “highly 
consistent” results across cities, “with Whites receiving positive responses at 
roughly twice the rate of equally qualified Black applicants.” Devah Pager & 
Bruce Western, Identifying Discrimination at Work: The Use of Field Experi-
ments, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 221, 226 (2012). 
 48. See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Sexual Harass-
ment, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 630, 632 (2011) (“Men’s risk of sexual harassment is 
substantially below that of women at every age.”); Joel T. Nadler & Margaret 
S. Stockdale, Workplace Gender Bias: Not Just Between Strangers, 14 N. AM. 
J. PSYCHOL. 281, 281–84 (2012) (summarizing social science research on em-
ployment discrimination faced by women versus men). 
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eighty-four percent of the workforce—could potentially experi-
ence job discrimination and bring a Title VII claim. However, 
as the research suggests, and as anyone with a passing famili-
arity with the United States’ history of oppression and segrega-
tion would predict, the workers who occupy the right-hand cir-
cle are much more likely to be women and people of color. 
D. ESTIMATING THE OVERLAP 
Combining Roemer’s research with demographic data from 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), then, we are able to 
estimate the overlap between workers who may be misclassi-
fied and those who are most likely to become Title VII plain-
tiffs, defined here as women and workers of color. The BLS 
provides data on the percent of each occupation held by women 
and by workers who are Black or African American, Asian, and 
Hispanic or Latino.49 These categories are not mutually exclu-
sive—a Black worker can also be counted as Latino, for exam-
ple—and we do not have statistics on the interactions between 
the sex and race/ethnicity variables: the number of Black wom-
en in a particular occupation, for example.50 
Figure 4 below shows BLS demographic data for the eight 
high misclassification occupations identified in Part I.B above, 
illustrating whether the workers in those eight occupations are 
also likely to be women and/or people of color. Some context is 
useful in interpreting Figure 4. Overall, in 2014, women repre-
sented 46.9 percent of employed persons aged sixteen and 
over.51 Black or African American workers represented 11.4 
percent; Asian workers represented 5.7 percent; and Hispanic 
or Latino workers represented 16.1 percent.52 These percent-
ages are marked on Figure 4 with dashed lines. When the per-
centage of women or workers of color in one of the eight high 
misclassification occupations exceeds their percentage in the 
overall population of employed persons, we can conclude that 
 
 49. Labor Force Statistics, supra note 38. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. The analysis presented here uses a snapshot of the labor market 
from 2014 as a rough proxy for the demographic profile of the workers who 
held the occupations identified in Roemer’s work, and of the plaintiffs who are 
captured in the court decision data presented below. A more extensive re-
search project would employ a time series approach, in which misclassification 
rates, worker demographics, and court decisions were all captured in the same 
set of successive years. Lack of access to the underlying CPS and DER data 
prevent this approach at present. 
 52. Id. 
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those workers are overrepresented in that occupation. Table 2 
then identifies each instance of overrepresentation by occupa-
tion. 
Figure 4: Top Eight Occupations by Percentage and 
Number of Workers Misclassified, with Worker De-
mographics by Occupation and by All Employed Persons 
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Table 2: Top Eight Occupations by Percentage and 
Number of Workers Misclassified, with Overrepresenta-
tion of Women, Black or African American, Asian, and 
Hispanic or Latino Workers Noted53 
Occupation 
Overrepresentation in Occupation 
Women 
Black or 
African 
American 
Asian 
Hispanic 
or Latino 
Judges, magistrates, and 
other judicial workers 
x    
Lawyers     
Clergy   x  
Real estate brokers and 
sales agents 
x    
Hairdressers, hairstylists, 
and cosmetologists 
x x   
Teacher assistants x x  x 
Door-to-door sales workers, 
news and street vendors, 
and related workers 
x   x 
Maids and housekeeping 
cleaners 
x x  x 
 
Of the eight high misclassification occupations in Figure 4 
and Table 2, women were overrepresented in six: real estate 
brokers and sales agents; judges, magistrates, and other judi-
cial workers; hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists; 
maids and housekeeping cleaners; teacher assistants; and door-
to-door sales workers, news and street vendors, and related 
workers.54 In all six occupations, women held more than fifty 
percent of jobs; in three (hairdressers, maids/housekeepers, and 
teacher assistants), women represented close to or above ninety 
percent of all workers.55 
With respect to workers of color, Black or African American 
workers were overrepresented in three of the eight high mis-
classification occupations: hairdressers, hairstylists, and cos-
 
 53. ROEMER, supra note 26; Labor Force Statistics, supra note 38. 
 54. Labor Force Statistics, supra note 38.  
 55. Women held 94.6 percent of hairdressing jobs, 88.6 percent of 
maid/housekeeping jobs, and 90.3 percent of teacher assistant jobs. Id. 
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metologists; maids and housekeeping cleaners; and teacher as-
sistants. Asians were overrepresented as clergy only; Hispanic 
or Latino workers were overrepresented as maids and house-
keeping cleaners (representing almost forty-four percent of 
workers in that occupation); teacher assistants; and door-to-
door sales workers, news and street vendors, and related work-
ers.56 
Thus, drawing on Figure 4 and Table 2, we can see that 
seven of the eight high misclassification occupations were held 
disproportionately by women and/or workers of color, leaving 
out only lawyers. Four of these occupations sit at the intersec-
tion of misclassification, race, and gender: hairdressers, maids 
and housekeepers, teacher assistants, and door-to-door sales 
workers and street vendors were all high misclassification oc-
cupations and held by outsize percentages of both women and 
workers of color. All of these workers occupy the overlap space 
in the Venn diagram in Figure 1; deprived of Title VII coverage 
if they experience job discrimination, unless they can bring and 
win a misclassification challenge in a Title VII lawsuit.57 
Returning, then, to the original question: to what extent is 
misclassification being felt by women and people of color—
groups of workers who have historically faced discrimination? 
In other words, is misclassification blocking Title VII from 
 
 56. Expanding beyond the eight occupations listed in Figure 4 and Table 2 
to consider the other seven occupations in which at least ten percent of work-
ers were misclassified, the BLS reports no demographic data for fishers and 
related fishing workers and miscellaneous social scientists and related work-
ers, two of the seven remaining occupations. Of the rest, women were 
overrepresented (to the tune of 95.5 percent) among childcare workers. Black 
or African American workers were overrepresented as barbers and, again, 
childcare workers; Asian workers were overrepresented as dentists; Hispanic 
or Latino workers were overrepresented as barbers; carpet, floor, and tile in-
stallers and finishers; and, in its third appearance, childcare workers. Of the 
remaining seven occupations that ranked highest by number, rather than per-
cent, of misclassified workers, Black or African American workers were 
overrepresented as driver/sales workers and truck drivers; Asian workers 
were overrepresented as marketing and sales managers and physicians and 
surgeons; Hispanics or Latinos were overrepresented as carpenters; construc-
tion laborers; and driver/sales workers and truck drivers. Id. 
 57. One might argue that women and workers of color who hold jobs in 
which they are overrepresented would be less, rather than more, likely to ex-
perience discrimination. However, the demographic statistics presented above 
say nothing about the gender or race of the workers’ supervisors or managers; 
it is therefore possible that a Latina housekeeper could experience discrimina-
tion at the hands of a supervisor with a different demographic profile. Moreo-
ver, discrimination does not need to occur across groups in order to be actiona-
ble; in-group discrimination can and does occur. 
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reaching the workers it is intended to protect? The Roemer and 
BLS results suggest that misclassification is both gendered and 
raced, occurring in occupations in which women and/or people 
of color are overrepresented. Again, the causes of this distribu-
tion are beyond this Article’s scope,58 but its effects seem clear: 
to further weaken an already compromised antidiscrimination 
regime by removing workers from its reach. 
II.  MISCLASSIFICATION CHALLENGES IN TITLE VII 
CASES   
The dire conclusion of the previous Section need not be 
true, however, if misclassified workers who experience discrim-
ination file suit under Title VII and argue successfully for re-
classification as employees for purposes of the litigation. The 
remainder of this Article therefore looks to the courts. Return-
ing again to the Venn diagram in Figure 1, one can imagine 
workers moving from the center overlap section into the circle 
on the right side, shedding their misclassified status and be-
coming eligible for Title VII coverage. Little is known, however, 
about whether the workers in the seven overlap occupations 
listed above—the real estate agents, hairdressers, maids, and 
others—actually make, and win, misclassification challenges in 
Title VII cases. The analysis presented in the following Parts 
seeks to describe those workers who make misclassification 
challenges in federal district court, as well as those who win, 
and to investigate why some plaintiffs are successful and some 
are not. 
A. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data set examined here consists of all Title VII cases 
filed in federal district courts over the ten years from 2005 to 
2014, in which workers made misclassification arguments that 
resulted in a decision available on Westlaw. After first receiv-
 
 58. This Article does not delve into the extensive literature on occupation-
al segregation by sex, race, and ethnicity. See generally William T. Bielby & 
James N. Baron, Men and Women at Work: Sex Segregation and Statistical 
Discrimination, 91 AM. J. SOC. 759 (1986) (discussing occupational segregation 
by sex); Robert M. Blackburn, The Measurement of Occupational Segregation 
and Its Component Dimensions, 15 INT’L J. SOC. RES. METHODOLOGY 175 
(2012) (summarizing approaches to occupational segregation by sex); William 
A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in Employment: 
Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 63 (1998) (discussing oc-
cupational segregation by race and sex). 
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ing training on coding protocols59 and completing research and 
readings on the law of misclassification, two law student coders 
ran an initial Westlaw search for the terms “advanced: (“title 
vii” and “independent contractor”) & DA(aft 12-31-2004 & bef 
01-01-2015)” in Westlaw’s federal district courts database.60 
The coders then reviewed each of the search results to deter-
mine whether it fit into the data set, i.e., whether the court en-
gaged with the misclassification question directly or merely 
mentioned the search terms in passing. Coders considered all 
decisions available on Westlaw, not just those that were desig-
nated “published” with a Federal Reporter citation. Through 
this process, coders identified 154 cases that were properly in 
the data set, and then coded a variety of pieces of information 
from each case, discussed further in the Sections below.61 
The law student coders worked as a pair, checking their 
conclusions with one another, and then reported their findings 
to the author during weekly meetings. In this sense, inter-coder 
reliability cannot be measured, as coding decisions were made 
by consensus. The author served as the arbiter of any differ-
ences of opinion, and also performed a final review and clean-
ing of the entire data set before analysis.62 
 
 59. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Variables, in ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed., 2004) 
(describing good coding protocols). 
 60. That search produced 659 results, from which coders identified 154 
cases that were properly in the data set. As part of this process, the coders 
identified and removed thirty-three decisions that were duplicates, i.e., the 
underlying case generated more than one opinion responsive to the search 
terms that appeared among the original 659 search results. The goal of this 
project was to code the district court’s final decision on misclassification; 
therefore, preliminary decisions that addressed misclassification but were 
then superseded by later decisions were struck from the data set. 
 61. Coders also identified cases in which courts addressed other reasons 
that a worker might not be classified as an employee, because the worker was 
a volunteer or an intern, for example. See, e.g., Day v. Jeannette Baseball 
Ass’n, Civil Action No. 12-267, 2013 WL 5786457, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 
2013) (deciding whether “an unpaid volunteer baseball coach for a community 
baseball league is entitled to protection against racial discrimination under 
Title VII as an ‘employee’”). While these cases raise similar issues to those 
cases in which a court decides between independent contractor and employee 
status, they are excluded from the data examined here because courts use dif-
ferent legal tests to distinguish between employees and interns or volunteers 
than between employees and independent contractors. 
 62. Other researchers have used similar methods in coding projects in-
volving court decisions. See, e.g., Eden B. King et al., Discrimination in the 
21st Century: Are Science and the Law Aligned?, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y L. 
54, 63 (2011) (describing a consensus-based coding approach to court decisions 
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B. SELECTION EFFECTS 
Though this data set is comprehensive as to all decisions 
available via Westlaw during the ten-year study period, the da-
ta are limited by selection effects, which constrain generaliza-
bility from the results.63 In other words, the cases examined in 
the coding process are not the entire universe of all possible 
misclassification challenges brought by Title VII plaintiffs, nor 
were they randomly chosen from that universe. Indeed, work-
ers who did not make a claim; whose claims were abandoned, 
settled privately, or resolved via the EEOC’s conciliation pro-
cess before any federal court filing; workers who filed suit in 
state court; and workers whose federal court decisions are not 
available via Westlaw are not included in the present analy-
sis.64 
Nevertheless, these data remain useful for three reasons. 
First, the subset of Title VII misclassification decisions that are 
available via Westlaw have important precedential value. 
Those that are published in a Federal Reporter are cited as au-
thority by other federal and state courts in subsequent Title VII 
misclassification cases; even those that carry only a Westlaw 
 
involving discrimination issues). 
 63. See, e.g., PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 265–67 (6th 
ed. 2008) (discussing selection effects). 
 64. These sets of missing cases were not included due to nonexistent data 
or data access difficulties. There are no records of employment discrimination 
disputes that a plaintiff has abandoned or settled privately without ever filing 
a lawsuit. Moreover, the EEOC does not track whether misclassification is an 
issue in a worker’s charge, investigation, or conciliation. See Code Table for 
EEOC Integrated Mission System (on file with author). The results of the 
EEOC conciliation process are similarly inaccessible due to their confidentiali-
ty. See What You Should Know: The EEOC, Conciliation, and Litigation, 
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/conciliation_litigation.cfm 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2016) (describing the conciliation process as “an informal 
and confidential [settlement] process”). Some state trial court decisions are 
available via Westlaw, but very few. For example, a search of all state trial 
court decisions and orders on Westlaw using the same search terms and time 
period yielded only two in which the court considered a misclassification chal-
lenge in a Title VII context. The plaintiff ’s Title VII claims survived in one 
case and did not in the other. Taylor v. Vestuto, No. A543723, 2011 WL 
2357449, at *9–10 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2011) (deeming plaintiff an employee for 
Title VII purposes); Cramer v. Cutner, Index No. 61443/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 29, 2012) (finding plaintiff to be an independent contractor for Title VII 
purposes). However, two is too small a pool of cases from which to draw any 
useful conclusions. Finally, while federal court decisions that are not available 
via Westlaw could theoretically be accessed by searching federal district 
courts’ dockets directly using the PACER system, such a project would be pro-
hibitively laborious and expensive. 
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citation are cited in legal briefs and court opinions.65 The deci-
sions in this data set also have a spillover effect on two other 
Title VII analyses that are closely related to the misclassifica-
tion question: whether an employer has the appropriate num-
ber of “employees” (fifteen) for Title VII coverage purposes,66 
and whether a worker may sue more than one putative employ-
er under Title VII.67 Finally, the cases studied here serve as 
precedent for misclassification decisions in lawsuits under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act,68 the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act,69 and many state law analogs,70 all of which 
are analyzed in pari materia with Title VII. 
Second, and similarly, the cases that resolve via private 
settlement or the EEOC’s conciliation process, and so fall out of 
the data before reaching federal court, are likely influenced by 
the outcomes of the litigated cases in this data set. This is be-
cause settlement bargaining occurs, famously, in the shadow of 
the law.71 In this conception, parties’ attempts to resolve their 
 
 65. See, e.g., Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Chadha v. Hardin Mem’l Hosp., No. 99-3166, 2000 WL 32023, at *2 
(6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2000)). 
 66. See, e.g., Williams v. Anchorage Marina, No. Civ. CCB-05-2855, 2006 
WL 470603, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2006) (deciding employment status of five 
workers who would count toward required fifteen minimum if deemed employ-
ees rather than independent contractors). 
 67. See Charlotte S. Alexander, Direct and Indirect Employment Under 
Title VII, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 68TH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR: WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE, AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?, 
(Kati Griffith ed.) (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author) (manuscript at 5–9) 
(explaining courts’ comingling of joint employment and misclassification anal-
yses). 
 68. See, e.g., Doud v. Yellow Cab of Reno, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00664-WGC, 
2015 WL 5533381, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2015) (citing Title VII cases in dis-
cussing employee-independent contractor distinction in ADA case). 
 69. See, e.g., Vahid v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1007–08 
(S.D. Iowa 2013) (using the same analysis to determine whether a worker was 
an employee or independent contractor for purposes of Title VII and the 
ADEA). 
 70. See, e.g., D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 891 A.2d 673, 677 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (using Title VII case law defining employee 
and independent contractor status to decide a dispute under the state Law 
Against Discrimination); Gover v. Royal Comm. Consultants, Inc., Index No. 
118987/06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 21, 2007) (stating in case involving employee or 
independent contractor status under the New York State and City Human 
Rights Laws, “[t]hus, for all intents and purposes, cases construing Title VII 
can be relied upon by the court in construing the local statutes relied upon by 
the plaintiff”). 
 71. See generally Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); 
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disputes outside of court are heavily influenced by their calcu-
lation of the odds of winning should they proceed to court. Fed-
eral courts’ treatment of misclassification disputes in Title VII 
cases provides data with which parties estimate their odds of 
victory, which in turn influences the positions they take during 
negotiations. Again, understanding the way in which federal 
courts dispose of Title VII misclassification disputes is im-
portant not only for understanding those cases resolved via liti-
gation, but likely also for those resolved out of court. 
Third, we can learn something from making educated 
guesses about the magnitude and direction of the selection ef-
fects. That is to say, given what we know independently about 
the occupational distribution of misclassification (the data pre-
sented above in Part I), we can hypothesize about the direction 
and magnitude of the selection bias in the litigation data exam-
ined here. We can thus get a sense of which misclassified work-
ers who experience discrimination take their claims to federal 
court, and which drop out of the data set. This is an important 
contribution in and of itself, speaking to how well workers are 
able to use the court system to redress workplace rights viola-
tions. These topics are discussed more fully in connection with 
the descriptive statistics presented in the next Section. 
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND SELECTION EFFECTS 
REVISITED 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 in the appendix report descriptive sta-
tistics for all variables collected by the coders. This Section dis-
cusses some key findings and returns to the subject of selection 
effects. With respect to the main variable of interest, misclassi-
fication outcomes, approximately sixty-six percent of plaintiffs 
lost, ending their Title VII claims completely.72 Of the surviving 
 
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 72. Here, a misclassification “win” is defined as any case in which the 
plaintiff had the opportunity to proceed with his or her Title VII claim. This 
includes cases in which the court addressed the misclassification issue on 
summary judgment and affirmatively deemed the plaintiff an employee 
(granting a plaintiff ’s motion for summary judgment) or declared the question 
still in dispute (denying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment). Plain-
tiff misclassification “wins” also include cases in which a court denied a de-
fendant’s motion to dismiss or granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss without 
prejudice, both of which preserved the plaintiff ’s ability to continue with the 
litigation or amend his or her complaint to correct pleading deficiencies. A 
misclassification “loss,” on the other hand, signifies a total loss, in which the 
court either granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice or found 
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fifty-three plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, approximately sixty-four 
percent ultimately settled; twenty-three percent lost on later 
pretrial motions or at trial; and six percent—only three cases—
ended in at least a partial plaintiff ’s win. (Four cases, or ap-
proximately eight percent, were still open at the time that cod-
ing was completed.) When Title VII outcomes are calculated for 
the whole data set of 154 cases, including both misclassification 
wins and losses, seventy-three percent of plaintiffs lost, twenty-
two percent settled, two percent won, and three percent of cases 
were still open.73 
These plaintiff success rates align generally with those 
found in other empirical studies of Title VII plaintiffs’ fate in 
federal court, though they also reveal some interesting differ-
ences. For instance, in Nielsen and her co-authors’ work, the 
authors found that forty percent of plaintiffs lost their Title VII 
claims, fifty-eight percent of cases settled, and two percent of 
plaintiffs ultimately won at trial.74 In comparison, in this Arti-
cle’s data, seventy-three percent of all plaintiffs lost their Title 
VII claims, twenty-two percent of cases settled, and two percent 
of plaintiffs ultimately won. While these differences could be 
explained by differences in the two studies’ data and methodol-
ogy,75 the lower overall plaintiff loss rates in Nielsen et al.’s 
work might suggest the rather obvious conclusion that Title VII 
plaintiffs who must overcome a misclassification challenge face 
a harder task than Title VII plaintiffs as a general matter. The 
misclassification inquiry thus appears to be acting as a sub-
stantial hurdle for Title VII plaintiffs. 
 
the plaintiff to be an independent contractor on summary judgment. In all in-
stances, coders searched the underlying court docket for motions for reconsid-
eration and appeals to ensure that they captured the court’s final disposition 
of the misclassification question, even if the decision available on Westlaw did 
not represent the final disposition. 
 73. It is possible that the plaintiffs who lost on the misclassification ques-
tion or on their underlying Title VII claims recovered under some other stat-
ute, such as a state antidiscrimination law or 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991), but the 
coding process did not capture those results. 
 74. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 186–87. In comparison, in their study of 
employment discrimination cases filed in federal courts between 1979 and 
2006, Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab report an overall plaintiff win rate 
of fifteen percent. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 8, at 127. 
 75. Nielsen et al. examined case filing data rather than judicial decisions 
available via Westlaw. They assembled and coded a random sample of 1672 
closed employment discrimination cases filed in seven U.S. district courts be-
tween 1998 and 2003. They also conducted interviews with plaintiffs, defend-
ants, and lawyers and examined charge filing data from the EEOC. Nielsen et 
al., supra note 8, at 181 (describing data and methodology). 
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However, comparing the outcome statistics for the plain-
tiffs who survived a misclassification challenge in this Article’s 
data set with the Nielsen et al. data also suggests some inter-
esting implications. The surviving plaintiffs in the data set 
studied here went on to lose twenty-three percent of their Title 
VII claims, settle sixty-four percent, and win six percent. In 
comparison, the larger pool of all antidiscrimination plaintiffs 
in the Nielsen data suffered a higher loss rate of forty percent, 
a comparable settlement rate of fifty-eight percent, and a lower 
win rate of two percent.76 It is not known how many of the Niel-
sen cases involved misclassification claims, so we are unable to 
make an apples-to-apples comparison. Yet the data do suggest 
that those plaintiffs who survive beyond a misclassification 
challenge ultimately do better with their underlying Title VII 
claims. This is slightly puzzling: there is no reason that strong 
discrimination evidence would necessarily co-occur with strong 
misclassification evidence, unless one assumes that some em-
ployers take the low road with respect to all of their employ-
ment practices. Therefore, there may be factors other than the 
merits at work here—attorney skill, perhaps, or chance. 
Descriptive statistics also give us a picture of the plaintiff 
characteristics in the data set, allowing us to explore and hy-
pothesize about selection effects. If our data set did capture the 
full universe of misclassified Title VII plaintiffs, then we would 
expect the occupational profiles of the plaintiffs to resemble 
those in the overlap area in the Venn diagram above in Figure 
1: the workers in the seven occupations held disproportionately 
by women and/or people of color who were also at high risk for 
misclassification and/or accounted for the largest numbers of 
misclassified workers. This is because, on the one hand, we 
would expect occupations with large percentages of misclassi-
fied workers who are women and/or people of color to generate 
misclassification challenges, because those plaintiffs are likely 
to have strong misclassification claims on the merits. On the 
other hand, we would also expect occupations that employ large 
numbers of misclassified workers to generate lawsuits involv-
ing misclassification challenges due to their numbers alone. 
Recall that these seven overlap occupations were real estate 
brokers and sales agents; clergy; judges, magistrates, and other 
judicial workers; hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists; 
maids and housekeeping cleaners; teacher assistants; and door-
 
 76. Id. at 186–87. 
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to-door sales workers, news and street vendors, and related 
workers.77 
Of these occupations, four appeared in the data set: real es-
tate and door-to-door sales workers each brought three cases 
(1.95 percent of all cases in the data set); clergy and judg-
es/judicial workers filed one case (0.65 percent) apiece. Hair-
dressers, maids and housekeepers, and teacher assistants—
jobs in which both women and workers of color were overrepre-
sented—did not appear in the data set at all. More generally, 
the data set was skewed toward white-collar occupations, with 
over two-thirds of plaintiffs holding white-collar jobs. Figure 5 
shows the top ten occupations in the data set, all of which ap-
peared in at least three cases.78 
Figure 5: Top Ten Occupations in Data Set by Percent 
Representation 
Note: N=154 
 
 77. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 78. The presence of the “lifeguards, recreational, protective service” occu-
pation may be slightly misleading, explained by a repeat plaintiff or plaintiffs. 
In four of the five cases in that occupational category, a group of plaintiffs who 
had worked as school sports referees sued the same two school districts for 
discrimination and argued for reclassification as employees rather than inde-
pendent contractors. Lanier v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:11-CV-01613-
LJO-GSA, 2013 WL 1904822 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2013); Quintero v. Fresno Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., No. 1:12-CV-00675-LJO-GSA, 2013 WL 268704 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 
24, 2013); Earl v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. F CV 11-1568-
LJO-GSA, 2012 WL 2798806 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2012); Quintero v. Clovis Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., No. 1:12-CV-00676-AWI-BAM, 2012 WL 2050736 (E.D. Cal. 
June 6, 2012). 
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 Though it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions from 
these small numbers, we can hypothesize that some workers’ 
presence in or absence from the data might be explained by 
workers’ access to the money, time, and legal knowledge neces-
sary to sue. The author’s previous empirical work has suggest-
ed that the lower a worker is on the socio-economic scale, the 
less likely he or she is to resolve workplace problems via litiga-
tion.79 The prevalence of white-collar workers in the data set—
including the high-misclassification real estate, clergy, and 
judge/judicial worker occupations—is consistent with this ob-
servation, as is the absence of the lowest paid of the seven over-
lap occupations, maids and housekeepers.80 Indeed, the most 
frequent of all occupations to appear in the data set, physicians 
and surgeons, is also one of the highest paid in the country.81 
Moreover, the weighted average of the national median hourly 
wages of all forty occupations on the Roemer list—those in 
which at least one percent of workers appeared to be misclassi-
fied—is $26.07, while that same figure for the occupations rep-
resented in the set of cases filed in court is the higher $32.28.82 
 
 79. Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law 
Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1072–73 (2014) (find-
ing, based on analysis of over 4300 worker interviews, that “legal knowledge 
. . . appears to decrease with a worker’s relative power and stability, and many 
workers simply may not have the information necessary to become workplace 
law enforcers” and that forty-three percent of workers who had experienced a 
recent problem on the job decided not to make a claim against their employer, 
primarily due to fear of retaliation and doubts about the efficacy of the claim-
ing process). 
 80. According to 2014 data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
the national hourly median wage for maids and housekeepers was $9.67. May 
2014 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, United States, 
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/oes/ 
2014/may/oes_nat.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) [hereinafter May 2014 Es-
timates]. 
 81. In a typical case brought by a physician or surgeon, the plaintiff al-
leged discrimination against a hospital at which he or she had privileges, and 
the hospital denied that the plaintiff was a hospital employee, as opposed to 
an independent contractor. See, e.g., Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., 904 F. 
Supp. 2d 699, 705 (E.D. Mich. 2012). Note that, due to physicians’ and sur-
geons’ high salaries, any recovery keyed to their earnings, such as backpay, 
would be quite high, making the costs of litigation in terms of time and in-
vestment worthwhile. Moreover, highly paid workers in this occupation could 
likely afford a specialist attorney, further signaling the high value and strong 
merits of the case to the court. 
 82. A weighted average takes into account the number of workers in each 
occupation as well as the wage earned. Wage figures are drawn from BLS sta-
tistics. May 2014 Estimates, supra note 80. 
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Thus, returning to the Venn diagram in Figure 1, we can 
conclude, albeit tentatively, that not all workers in the seven 
overlap occupations attempt a move rightward, toward Title 
VII coverage. On the whole, the plaintiffs who do seek reclassi-
fication and redress for discrimination are white-collar workers 
like physicians and surgeons, not the lower-paid maids and 
hairdressers who experience misclassification at higher rates. 
While these blue-collar workers could have fallen out of the da-
ta set because they settled or conciliated their cases prior to fil-
ing in federal court—or filed in state court instead—previous 
research suggests that these workers more likely stayed silent, 
or chose to leave their jobs, instead of exercising their Title VII 
rights in court. 
III.  REGRESSION DESIGN, PREDICTIONS FROM 
THEORY, AND RESULTS   
This Part turns from those workers who were absent from 
the data to those who were present, first describing the regres-
sion design and variables used in the analysis of misclassifica-
tion outcomes, then discussing three theories that might pre-
dict or explain those outcomes, and, finally, presenting the 
regression results. 
A. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
The dependent variable in this analysis—the primary re-
sult that the coding project attempts to describe and explain—
is the outcome of the plaintiffs’ misclassification challenges. For 
each case in the data set, coders also recorded a set of inde-
pendent variables describing characteristics of the litigants, the 
claims in the lawsuit and the misclassification decision itself, 
and the court and judge. These variables allow exploration of 
whether certain types of litigants, certain types of claims, 
and/or certain types of judges appear to influence the outcome 
of misclassification challenges.83 
With respect to the plaintiff, we coded whether he or she 
was represented by an attorney and, if so, an attorney special-
izing in employment, labor, or civil rights law;84 the plaintiff ’s 
 
 83. The choice and construction of these variables was guided by previous 
empirical work by Laura Beth Nielsen and her co-authors on the fate of Title 
VII cases in federal court. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at app. (listing varia-
bles). 
 84. The specialist attorney designation was determined by looking at each 
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occupation, and whether it was blue or white-collar; the percent 
and number of misclassified workers in the plaintiff ’s occupa-
tion, per the Roemer data; and the percent of women, Black or 
African American, Asian, and Hispanic or Latino workers in 
the plaintiff ’s occupation, per the BLS data. Regarding the de-
fendant, we coded the industry: trucking, construction, mainte-
nance; retail; manufacturing, agriculture; package delivery; 
school, university; medical, health, social services; media, en-
tertainment; government; and financial services, insurance, 
other professional services.85 We also coded descriptors of the 
lawsuit and misclassification decision, noting the type(s) of dis-
crimination asserted,86 fact pattern(s) giving rise to the Title 
VII claim(s),87 the legal test used by the court (no test, common 
law test, hybrid test),88 whether the court referred to a written 
contract between the parties in its misclassification decision, 
and the year the misclassification decision was made. Finally, 
with respect to the judge and court issuing the misclassification 
decision, we coded the deciding judge’s imputed political ideolo-
gy and the circuit in which the deciding district court was lo-
cated.89 
 
plaintiff attorney’s website. If the attorney or firm listed employment, labor, or 
civil rights law as one of its practice areas, it was designated a “specialist.” 
 85. In order to minimize the number of independent variables due to the 
small number of observations in this data set, defendant industry variables 
were not used in the regression described below, but are reported in Table 6.1 
in the Appendix of this Article. The plaintiff occupation variables that were 
included in the regression likely capture much of the same information con-
tained in the defendant industry variable. 
 86. Claim types were race, sex, religion, national origin, color discrimina-
tion, and retaliation. Each case may have more than one claim type. Because 
of their small number of observations, claims for religious, national origin, and 
color discrimination are grouped into one “other discrimination” variable for 
purposes of this analysis. 
 87. Fact patterns were failure to hire, termination, and harassment or 
other discriminatory conditions of work. Each case may have more than one 
fact pattern. 
 88. See infra Part III.B.1 for explanations of these tests. 
 89. The presiding judge’s political ideology is imputed from the political 
party of the judge’s nominating President. This is a common technique in re-
search on judges’ decisions. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES 
POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5–6 (2006) 
(using political party of a judge’s nominating president as a proxy for a judge’s 
own political ideology). 
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B. PREDICTIONS FROM THEORY 
This Section sets out predictions for the associations be-
tween the independent and dependent variables, drawing on 
three theories about the drivers of litigation outcomes in civil 
cases generally, and in cases involving discrimination allega-
tions and/or contract disputes specifically. These theories are 
not mutually exclusive—the goal here is not to pick a “winner” 
among theories—but they do provide a useful set of lenses 
through which to view the results. 
1. Legal Formalism 
In their study of the outcomes of Title VII cases in federal 
court, Laura Beth Nielsen and her co-authors describe legal 
formalism in employment discrimination cases as: 
[H]old[ing] that legal outcomes should reflect the law on the books. 
The outcome of a case should be determined by how well a plaintiff 
meets the formal requirements for making and proving a claim of dis-
crimination. Because different theories of discrimination require dif-
ferent elements of proof, ceteris paribus, a formal legal model sug-
gests that there will be variation in plaintiff success across different 
legal claims.90 
Richard Posner elaborates that formalism refers to: 
[T]he use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from prem-
ises accepted as authoritative. Formalism enables a commentator to 
pronounce the outcome of the case as being correct or incorrect, in ap-
proximately the same way that the solution to a mathematical prob-
lem can be pronounced correct or incorrect.91 
A legal formalist would thus predict that the law on the books 
matters to case outcomes, that different legal tests will produce 
different outcomes in a predictable way that aligns with some 
measure of the strength of the merits. 
However, none of the independent variables coded in this 
project purports to measure the merits of a plaintiff ’s misclassi-
fication challenge as a way to pronounce misclassification out-
comes “correct” or “incorrect” as a matter of legal formalism. 
Other researchers have used various proxies to assess a claim’s 
merits, but constructing such a variable is extremely difficult.92 
 
 90. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 178. 
 91. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpre-
tation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 
(1986). 
 92. Nielsen et al. provide an insightful summary of the difficulties in at-
tempting to code the quality of a case: 
  
938 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:907 
 
Some of the independent variables listed above may capture 
something about merits: the fact that a plaintiff is pro se may 
suggest that his or her case is particularly weak, and that no 
attorney would sign on; a specialist attorney’s presence in a 
case might signal that the attorney judges the merits to be par-
ticularly strong.93 
Likewise, misclassification claims by workers in occupa-
tions with high percentages of misclassified workers, per Roe-
mer, might be predicted to have greater success, as they might 
be strong on the merits. However, even the occupation most at 
risk for misclassification on Roemer’s list, real estate sales 
workers, had a misclassification rate of less than fifty percent, 
so there is no guarantee that any given real estate sales plain-
tiff in this data set fell into the fifty percent who were misclas-
sified. Moreover, as discussed above, the Roemer list relies on 
self-reported classifications, which may or may not align with a 
court’s assessment of a worker’s true employment classification 
under Title VII law. 
Nevertheless, if legal formalists are correct that the merits 
of a case can be ascertained and judged as an objective matter 
against a given set of legal requirements, then we may see in-
creasing misclassification success rates in cases brought by at-
torneys and specialist attorneys, and perhaps also in cases 
brought by plaintiffs in occupations at great risk of misclassifi-
 
It is important to note that we attempted in the coding of case files to 
construct valid measures of what can be conceived of as a latent or 
unmeasured variable of the “quality” of a case. Several of our 
measures might capture aspects of this variable, including the index 
of legal effort, the outcome of a case in the EEOC, and the EEOC pri-
ority code, but none is definitive. We attempted, without success, to 
have coders provide a subjective rating of the strength of a case, but 
we learned that there are inherent limitations to case files as a source 
of indicators about the “merits” of a case. Unlike some medical mal-
practice research in which medical records can be sent to medical pro-
fessionals to assess, the merits of the case in employment discrimina-
tion depend on subjective assessments of job performance and the 
meaning of employer actions. Even where such records were included 
in the file, there is no standard for keeping employment records that 
would allow us to evaluate personnel files like a medical professional 
can do using agreed upon standards of care. We coded sets of docu-
ments constructed by the adversarial process of which they are a 
part. The relationship between those documents and a “good” or “bad” 
case are difficult to discern. 
Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 182. 
 93. Id. at 189 (“The powerful effect of legal representation might be ex-
plained as a selection effect. That is, obtaining legal representation reveals an 
otherwise unmeasured variable of quality of case.”). 
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cation, though both variables are extremely rough merits prox-
ies.94 
In addition, if legal formalists are right that differing legal 
requirements should produce differing outcomes, then we 
would expect to see different misclassification win rates de-
pending on the test a court uses to determine a worker’s proper 
status. Courts use one of two multi-factored rubrics: the com-
mon law approach, which adopts the principles of agency law 
and focuses primarily on the employer’s right to control the pu-
tative employee; or the hybrid common law-economic realities 
test, which considers both an employer’s control and, more 
broadly, the relationship of economic dependence between 
worker and employer.95 Because the common law test is gener-
ally perceived to be the more restrictive of the two, one would 
predict that misclassification challenges subject to that analy-
sis would fail more frequently.96 
However, some commentators, including the authors of the 
new Restatement (Third) of Employment Law, have concluded 
that there is actually little difference in practice between the 
tests for employee status.97 If the Restatement is correct in its 
characterization of the law, any difference between the two 
tests may actually dissolve when applied, and we should see no 
 
 94. The critical realist, however, might interpret such results as evidence 
of the attorneys’ signaling of plaintiff power and status, not of (or in addition 
to) the underlying merits of a case. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 95. Compare Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 
(1992) (discussing the common law test), and Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence 
v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989) (discussing the same), with Oestman v. 
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1992) (“The hybrid 
test, which is most often applied to actions under Title VII, is a combination of 
the economic realities test and the common law right to control test.”), and 
EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Consequently, the 
hybrid standard that combines the common law ‘right to control’ with the ‘eco-
nomic realities’ as applied in Title VII cases is the correct standard . . . .”). 
 96. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1069 (10th Cir. 
1998) (contrasting the “stringent” common law approach with the more per-
missive economic reality factors that are incorporated into the hybrid test). 
 97. As the Restatement puts it, “Decisions interpreting the meaning of 
employee under the federal antidiscrimination laws illustrate the lack of any 
sharp distinction between the common-law test, at least as formulated in Reid 
and Darden, and a multifactor economic-realities test.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. d–e (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 
2014) (“The antidiscrimination-law decisions thus highlight the broad common 
ground covered by the common-law test and the economic-realities test in de-
termining whether or not to classify a service provider as an employee.” (citing 
Murray v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]here is no functional difference between the . . . formulations.”))). 
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difference in the outcomes of misclassification challenges sub-
ject to the two tests. If, however, there is a meaningful distinc-
tion between the two tests in practice, and if the legal formal-
ists are correct, then the “test” independent variable may exert 
an influence on misclassification outcomes. 
2. Contractual Formalism 
A second theory that might hold predictive value in mis-
classification cases is contractual formalism. Contractual for-
malism holds that the words of a contract matter, and that 
judges should hew strictly to the text in matters of interpreta-
tion.98 Viewing misclassification cases through this lens, one 
would expect courts to pay a great deal of attention to the de-
tails of the contract, if any, between the parties, to determine 
the true nature of their relationship. In fact, some courts’ for-
mulations of the common law test have developed to include a 
formalistic element. Courts in the Fourth Circuit consider the 
parties’ “mutual intent to create an independent contractor re-
lationship.”99 Courts in other circuits also commonly consider 
the parties’ beliefs about their relationship, as evidenced by the 
existence of a written contract.100 
 
 98. Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 
OR. L. REV. 1131, 1171 (1995) (describing formalism as historically holding up 
“the precise word . . . as the sovereign talisman” (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady 
Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917))). 
 99. Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 115 F.3d 256, 262–63 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
 100. See, e.g., Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 190 F.3d 799, 805–06 
(7th Cir. 1999) (finding the plaintiff ’s status as an independent contractor, 
and therefore not an employee, was “confirmed” by an agreement between the 
parties expressly referring to the plaintiff as an “independent contractor”); 
Lockyer v. AXA Advisors, L.L.C., No. 2:10-CV-00678, 2010 WL 4612040, at *3 
(D. Utah Oct. 12, 2010) (“[T]he Agent Agreement establishes that plaintiff was 
an independent contractor with the AXA Network.”); Kravis v. Karr Barth 
Assoc., Civil Action No. 09-485, 2010 WL 337646, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 
2010) (“In evaluating whether or not Kravis qualifies as an employee, the 
Court will first consider the intent of the parties, as evinced by the contract 
Kravis signed to become a Sales Agent with Defendants. Where parties have 
reduced their agreement to writing, courts may ascertain the parties’ intent by 
examining the writing.”); DeSouza v. EGL Eagle Global Logistics LP, 596 F. 
Supp. 2d 456, 464 (D. Conn. 2009) (“[T]he Court notes that contractual lan-
guage ‘fixing the relationship between [the plaintiff and the defendant], alt-
hough not dispositive, provides strong evidence of the parties’ intentions.’” 
(quoting Taracido v. United States, 93 Civ. 8266(LLS), 94 Civ. 3062(LLS), 
1995 WL 217525, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1995))); Taylor v. BP Express, Inc., 
No. CV 407-182, 2008 WL 5046071, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2008) (“[C]ontract 
provisions that refer to Plaintiff as a ‘contractor’ must be given great weight.”). 
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However, the law of employee status has a conflicted rela-
tionship with contractual formalism. Though some courts view 
written contracts between the parties as evidence of a worker’s 
true status, others are clear that the existence of a written con-
tract is not dispositive of the nature of the employment rela-
tionship.101 Indeed, courts in misclassification cases widely 
state the proposition that “an employer may not avoid Title VII 
by affixing a label to a person that does not capture the sub-
stance of the employment relationship.”102 The idea is that em-
ployers should not be permitted unilaterally to classify workers 
in such a way as to avoid antidiscrimination obligations; the fox 
should not, after all, guard the hen house. Courts are thus in-
structed to disregard labels and instead to consider the facts of 
the relationship between the hiring and hired parties. Courts 
that disregard the existence of written contracts in misclassifi-
cation cases extend this rule rejecting unilateral labels to bilat-
eral contracts as well. Courts that pay close attention to the ex-
istence of a written contract take the opposite position, 
adopting a contractual formalist stance. 
The independent variable that captures whether a court re-
ferred to a written contract between the parties should there-
fore reveal interesting results about the extent to which courts 
rely on written contracts in their misclassification decisions, 
and whether that reliance is correlated with success or failure 
for the plaintiffs, all else equal. 
 
 101. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that when determining whether an individual is an employee or inde-
pendent contractor for Title VII purposes, courts are cautioned against relying 
on the existence of a contract that refers to a party as an independent contrac-
tor); Allen v. U.S. Sec’y of Def., No. 4:10CV1928 FRB, 2012 WL 401062, at *4 
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2012) (discussing the same); Feldmann v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 
No. 4:09CV2129MLM, 2011 WL 382201, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 3, 2011) (“The 
existence of a contract referring to a party as an independent contractor does 
not end the inquiry.” (quoting Schweiger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 207 
F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2000))). 
 102. Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 
1996); see also, e.g., Davis v. N.Y. Sports Officials’ Council, No. 7:09-CV-0514 
GTS/GHL, 2010 WL 3909688, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (“[C]ourts in this 
circuit look ‘beyond mere labels in assessing whether defendant is an employ-
er, and apply the common law of agency to determine whether an individual is 
an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of Title VII . . . .’” 
(quoting Deshpande v. Medisys Health Network, Inc., No. 07-CV-0375, 2010 
WL 1539745, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010))); Bigalke v. Neenah Foundry 
Co., No. 05-C-29, 2006 WL 1663717, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 9, 2006) 
(“[A]llowing employers’ verbiage and ipse dixit to be outcome determinative 
would allow employers to evade Title VII entirely simply by using the term 
‘independent contractor’ when the individual is really an employee.”). 
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3. Critical Realism 
The third possible explanatory theory is critical realism. 
Again returning to Nielsen and her co-authors: 
The critical realist sees the social organization of litigation systemati-
cally working against certain parties and social groups. Plaintiffs, as 
one-shot litigants, are at a serious disadvantage compared to defend-
ants, who more often are repeat players. Socially privileged groups, in 
better-paying jobs, with more education, with more influence within 
the work organization, will convert these social resources into legal 
resources. As a result, they should enjoy greater success in litiga-
tion.103 
Thus, unlike the two formalist theories summarized above, ac-
cording to critical realism, the law and the contract do not mat-
ter to litigation outcomes as much as the identity and status of 
the parties to the litigation and the social context within which 
a lawsuit unfolds. 
Here, one might predict two results if critical realism is at 
work. First, one might observe lower misclassification win rates 
by plaintiffs in blue-collar occupations and in occupations with 
high percentages of women and people of color—those with 
lower social status and less power to bend litigation results in 
their favor. One might also observe more plaintiff wins in deci-
sions made by Democrat-appointed judges. Though it is not 
clear that a misclassification decision is itself ideological, the 
misclassification question might be seen as crucial to the pro-
ject of keeping the courts open to employment discrimination 
plaintiffs, a view perhaps more associated with politically lib-
eral Democratic appointees. 
Second, the critical realist might predict a bias against 
plaintiffs whose underlying substantive Title VII claims are 
generally disfavored by the courts—here, perhaps race and na-
tional origin discrimination plaintiffs. At first glance, a plain-
tiff ’s allegations of a particular kind of discrimination would 
seem to be unrelated to the plaintiff ’s allegations about her 
proper employment classification. Nevertheless, other research 
has established that race and national origin discrimination 
cases, as compared to cases alleging other types of discrimina-
tion, fare particularly poorly in court.104 Previous work by this 
 
 103. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 180. 
 104. See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empiri-
cal Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge 
Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 511, 516 (2003) (reporting low success rates in jury trials in dis-
crimination cases filed by women and minorities); Wendy Parker, Lessons in 
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author with Camille Gear Rich and Zev Eigen has also hypoth-
esized about the effects of a post-racial ideology—the idea that 
“true” racism rarely occurs any more—in shaping judges’ and 
juries’ views of race discrimination claims as meritless.105 It is 
possible, therefore, that judges might use the misclassification 
decision as an early way to rid their dockets of race and nation-
al origin discrimination cases that they view as nuisance 
claims. Indeed, former U.S. District Court Judge Nancy 
Gertner relates that federal judges are explicitly coached to 
find procedural and other grounds for early dismissal in order 
to eliminate complex and time-consuming employment discrim-
ination cases from their dockets.106 Thus, critical realism would 
predict greater losses on the misclassification question for 
plaintiffs who are themselves less wealthy and powerful, who 
bring disfavored claims of discrimination, and whose cases are 
adjudicated by politically conservative judges. 
It bears repeating that these three theories may both com-
plement and contradict one another in interesting ways; they 
are presented here to provide a loose framework for analysis 
and a set of possible views on the regression results, not as a 
way to prove which theory is more “right” than the others. We 
turn, then, to the data. 
 
Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 893 
(2006) (presenting data on race discrimination plaintiffs’ losses in federal 
court). 
 105. Camille Gear Rich et al., Post-Racial Hydraulics: The Hidden Dangers 
of the Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2016) (describing the hypothetical 
by Camille Gear Rich and Zev Eigen); see also Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From 
the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” Days of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed 
Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 685, 705 (2013) (“The implications of post-racialism beliefs, to the ex-
tent that these views taint judges’ perceptions of employment discrimination 
cases, are extremely problematic for current summary judgment practices.”); 
Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2001) (“When it comes to race cases, which are gener-
ally the most difficult claim for a plaintiff to succeed on, courts often seem 
mired in a belief that the claims are generally unmeritorious, brought by 
whining plaintiffs who have been given too many, not too few, breaks along 
the way.”). 
 106. Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J.F. 109, 117 (2012) (“At the 
start of my judicial career in 1994, the trainer teaching discrimination law to 
new judges announced, ‘Here’s how to get rid of civil rights cases,’ and went on 
to recite a litany of [strategies].”). 
  
944 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:907 
 
C. REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 3 below reports regression results. The analysis here 
uses logistic regression to identify statistically significant asso-
ciations between the independent variables coded from each 
case and the dependent variable—the outcome of plaintiffs’ 
misclassification challenges.107 Regression allows us to estimate 
the strength of any association between, for example, specialist 
attorney representation and a misclassification win, holding all 
other variables constant. Measuring statistical significance is 
necessary to determine whether associations that appear be-
tween variables are reliable, or whether they are actually a re-
sult of measurement or other error.108 
 
 107. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A 
MODERN APPROACH 68 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining multiple regression analysis 
as allowing the researcher to “explicitly control for many other factors that 
simultaneously affect the dependent variable”). Because the dependent varia-
ble here can take only two values (the plaintiff wins or loses on the misclassifi-
cation question), this analysis employs logistic regression, or logit. However, 
the output, or coefficients, produced by a logistic regression equation are ex-
tremely difficult to interpret. This Article follows other empirical legal schol-
arship in transforming the regression coefficients into marginal effects, hold-
ing all other variables at their means, which better lend themselves to 
interpretation. Consistent with Epstein and others, Table 3 thus reports mar-
ginal effects in the “Coefficient” column. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEO-
RETICAL & EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 22 (2013) (describing use of 
marginal effects at means and reporting of transformed coefficients). As an 
alternative to logit, other researchers prefer the probit model; still others, par-
ticularly in applied economics, advocate using the linear probability model 
(LPM). See LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIR-
ICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 215–21 (2014) (discussing choice of logit model for re-
gressions involving binary dependent variables). Following common practice in 
empirical legal scholarship, logit was used to produce the results discussed be-
low, though, notably, the set of statistically significant results produced by 
running logit, probit, and LPM here differs only slightly. See Marc F. 
Bellemare, Love It or Logit, or: Man, People *Really* Care About Binary De-
pendent Variables, MARC F. BELLEMARE: AGRIC., DEV., & FOOD POL. (June 10, 
2013), http://marcfbellemare.com/wordpress/9024 (“[B]ecause no estimator is 
perfect, you should you [sic] always estimate all three (LPM, probit, and logit) 
and compare their results to make sure nothing is amiss.”). For a discussion of 
the tradeoffs among logit, probit, and LPM, see JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-
STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S 
COMPANION (2009). and see also WOOLDRIDGE, supra at 247–50 (explaining 
use of LPM for a binary dependent variable, discussing shortcomings, and not-
ing that logit or probit are often used instead). 
 108. More specifically, measures of statistical significance derive from a 
process called hypothesis testing, which determines whether one can confi-
dently reject the “null hypothesis,” or the position that “in the universe, no re-
lationship exists between two variables or no difference exists between two 
groups on a particular attribute.” LARRY D. BARNETT, THE PLACE OF LAW: THE 
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Table 3: Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Non-specialist attorney repre-
sentation 0.173 0.112 -0.047 0.393 
Specialist attorney representa-
tion 0.362* 0.111 0.144 0.580 
White-collar plaintiff occupa-
tion  0.011 0.146 -0.274 0.297 
Percent of workers misclassi-
fied in occupation  0.012 0.008 -0.004 0.027 
Percent of workers in occupa-
tion: women 0.029 0.016 -0.002 0.060 
Percent of workers in occupa-
tion: Black or African Ameri-
can 
-0.048 0.098 -0.240 0.144 
Percent of workers in occupa-
tion: Asian -0.020 0.079 -0.175 0.135 
Percent of workers in occupa-
tion: Hispanic or Latino 0.112 0.065 -0.015 0.239 
Race discrimination claim in 
case -0.036 0.116 -0.263 0.192 
Sex discrimination claim in 
case 0.040 0.109 -0.175 0.254 
Other discrimination claim in 
case 0.184 0.152 -0.114 0.483 
 
ROLE AND LIMITS OF LAW IN SOCIETY 417 (2011). Measures of statistical sig-
nificance are commonly deployed as a way to deal with the error that is intro-
duced when a random sample is drawn from a larger population and then con-
clusions from the sample are applied to the whole. Some argue that there is no 
need to consider statistical significance when considering data drawn from an 
entire population rather than from a sample. See, e.g., id. (contending that 
there is no need to compute statistical significance when the data examined 
“come from the entire universe of interest”). However, this view is not univer-
sal among empiricists, many of whom argue that measures of statistical signif-
icance are necessary even when one’s data arguably describes an entire popu-
lation. This is because even observations from an entire putative “population” 
are almost always applied to other, larger, imagined superpopulations, which 
include additional, future occurrences that are presently unobserved. See, e.g., 
Andrew Gelman, How Do You Interpret Standard Errors from a Regression Fit 
to the Entire Population?, STATISTICAL MODELING, CAUSAL INFERENCE, AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.andrewgelman.com/2011/10/25/ 
how-do-you-interpret-standard-errors-from-a-regression-fit-to-the-entire 
-population (discussing need to compute some measure of uncertainty because 
no putative population is ever truly a population). This Article takes the latter 
position: although coders here collected the entire population of Title VII mis-
classification decisions from 2005 through 2014 available on Westlaw, as ex-
plained in Part II.B above, the data set cannot properly be considered a com-
plete population. Thus, the article deploys measures of statistical significance, 
using a single asterisk to denote significance at the .05 level. See EPSTEIN & 
MARTIN, supra note 107, at 283 (discussing denoting statistical significance at 
.05 level); WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 107, at 135–36 (discussing statistical sig-
nificance and choice of significance levels). 
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Retaliation claim in case 0.027 0.104 -0.177 0.231 
Failure to hire fact pattern in 
case -0.276* 0.077 -0.427 -0.125 
Termination fact pattern in 
case -0.194 0.209 -0.604 0.217 
Harassment/discriminatory 
conditions claim in case -0.125 0.192 -0.501 0.251 
Reference to written contract 
in case -0.258* 0.090 -0.434 -0.083 
2006 -0.121 0.183 -0.480 0.238 
2007 0.337 0.282 -0.215 0.889 
2008 0.075 0.327 -0.565 0.715 
2009 -0.035 0.209 -0.445 0.375 
2010 -0.086 0.194 -0.467 0.295 
2011 0.128 0.260 -0.381 0.636 
2012 0.116 0.228 -0.332 0.563 
2013 0.189 0.292 -0.384 0.761 
2014 0.448 0.238 -0.018 0.914 
First Circuit 0.682* 0.198 0.294 1.071 
Second Circuit 0.359* 0.178 0.010 0.709 
Third Circuit 0.281 0.194 -0.100 0.662 
Fourth Circuit 0.347* 0.163 0.027 0.667 
Sixth Circuit -0.064 0.091 -0.243 0.115 
Seventh Circuit -0.051 0.085 -0.218 0.116 
Eighth Circuit 0.265 0.214 -0.154 0.684 
Ninth Circuit 0.103 0.143 -0.177 0.383 
Tenth Circuit 0.110 0.195 -0.273 0.493 
Eleventh Circuit 0.087 0.154 -0.215 0.389 
D.C. Circuit 0.560* 0.269 0.032 1.087 
Democrat-appointed judge -0.159 0.104 -0.362 0.045 
Notes: N = 154; *p < 0.05; pseudo R2 = 0.352. Coefficients are reported as 
marginal effects at mean values of all variables. For the non-binary varia-
bles (attorney representation, circuit, year), the variables in the base cat-
egory are pro se, the Fifth Circuit, and 2005. All other listed variables are 
binary; their opposite value is in the base category. 
 
In interpreting the regression results in Table 3, each 
number listed in the “Coefficient” column should be considered 
in conjunction with its corresponding value that has been left 
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out of the equation, or assigned to the “base category.”109 For 
example, Table 3 tells us the probability of a plaintiff ’s mis-
classification win when a judge refers to a written contract be-
tween the parties (the value included in the regression equa-
tion), as compared to cases with no such reference (the value in 
the base category). For variables that can take on more than 
two values, the value assigned to the base category is noted at 
the end of Table 3.110 Table 3 also reports standard errors and 
ninety-five percent confidence intervals to give a sense of the 
precision of the estimates, or the range of values that the coeffi-
cient could take on above and below the figure reported in Ta-
ble 3.111 
Turning to the results, we can see from Table 3 that five 
independent variables were associated at a statistically signifi-
cant level with a plaintiff ’s misclassification win, as indicated 
by the coefficient’s positive sign: specialist attorney representa-
tion and decisions made by courts within the First, Second, 
Fourth, and D.C. Circuits. More specifically, the probability of a 
plaintiff misclassification win increased by 0.362 for plaintiffs 
with specialist representation, as compared to pro se plaintiffs. 
This 0.362 difference represents a 348% increase over a pro se 
plaintiff ’s win probability.112 Notably, the difference in win 
 
 109. As Lee Epstein and her co-authors explain it, in logistic regressions, 
“one of the variables is left out of the regression equation, with the result that 
the coefficients of the other variables indicate their relation to that one.” 
EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 107, at 23. 
 110. The results for independent variables that are continuous—those that 
report the percentage of misclassified workers and demographics of workers in 
each occupation—are interpreted differently. For those, the regression equa-
tion estimates the impact on the dependent variable from a one unit increase 
in the independent variable. The transformation of logistic regression coeffi-
cients using marginal effects at means (MEMs) complicates this somewhat. 
However, none of the continuous variables produced statistically significant 
results in the regression reported in Table 3. See RICHARD WILLIAMS, MAR-
GINAL EFFECTS FOR CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 3, https://www3.nd.edu/ 
~rwilliam/stats3/Margins02.pdf (last revised Jan. 23, 2016) (“MEMs for con-
tinuous variables measure the instantaneous rate of change, which may or 
may not be close to the effect on P(Y=1) of a one unit increase in Xk.”). 
 111. See EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 107, at 238–40 (advocating for re-
porting not only standard errors but also ninety-five percent confidence inter-
vals). 
 112. A pro se plaintiff ’s win probability was 0.104; the predicted probabil-
ity for specialist-represented plaintiffs was 0.466; the 0.362 difference repre-
sents a 348 percent increase over the pro se plaintiff ’s misclassification win 
probability. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 107, at 24 (discussing 
calculation of percentage change in outcome probability). Taking account of 
the ninety-five percent confidence interval, however, we can see that the coef-
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probabilities between pro se and non-specialist represented 
plaintiffs was not significant, meaning that we cannot draw 
any conclusions from those results in Table 3. Nevertheless, it 
is clear from other research that pro se plaintiffs operate at a 
significant disadvantage as compared to represented plaintiffs, 
whether due to the underlying lack of merit of their claims or 
lack of attorney guidance; this finding aligns with that re-
search.113 
The other set of variables that were positively correlated 
with a plaintiff ’s misclassification win were a district court’s 
location in the First, Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits. Cases 
decided in these circuits fared better than those decided by 
courts in the Fifth Circuit, the value in the base category. The 
“Circuit” variable was included in the regression to capture po-
tential differences in geography, court makeup, and in the legal 
rules that courts employ in misclassification cases. Here, an 
explanatory note is in order. 
Though the coders originally recorded whether each dis-
trict court used the common law or hybrid test for employee 
status, this “test” variable was not used in the regression re-
ported in Table 3. This is because in fourteen cases, courts used 
no test at all, and conclusorily declared the plaintiff an inde-
pendent contractor on the basis of the pleadings, the existence 
of a written contract, or a plaintiff admission.114 When the “test” 
variable is included in the regression, it creates problems, as 
the fourteen no-test values perfectly predict plaintiff misclassi-
fication losses. When the no-test values are dropped, the choice 
between the common law and hybrid tests turns out to have no 
statistically significant effect on the misclassification out-
come—possibly lending support to the Restatement’s position 
that the two tests are functionally equivalent in practice.115 
 
ficient could be as low as 0.144 and as high as 0.580, meaning that the mis-
classification win probability for specialist-represented plaintiffs could actual-
ly increase (as compared to pro se plaintiffs) by between 138 and 558 percent. 
 113. See Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 188–89 (finding that pro se plain-
tiffs in their sample were “almost three times more likely to have their cases 
dismissed, [we]re less likely to gain early settlement, and [we]re twice as like-
ly to lose on summary judgment. . . . The powerful effect of legal representa-
tion might be explained as a selection effect. That is, obtaining legal represen-
tation reveals an otherwise unmeasured variable of quality of case”). 
 114. In the remaining 140 cases, seventy-one percent of courts used the 
common law test and twenty-nine percent used the hybrid test. 
 115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01 cmt. d–e (AM. LAW INST., 
Proposed Final Draft 2014). 
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Moreover, a court’s use of no test at all was highly correlated 
with a plaintiff ’s pro se status and with the misclassification 
decision’s reference to a written contract, variables that them-
selves produced significant results. For these reasons, the “test” 
variable was dropped from the regression.116 
Moreover, among the courts that did use a test, their choice 
of the common law or hybrid test was highly correlated with 
the circuit in which they were located. As Table 4 shows, all 
misclassification decisions issued by district courts in the Fifth 
Circuit, for example, that used a test used the hybrid test. This 
is in contrast with the Second Circuit, in which courts used the 
common law test in all nineteen decisions. 
Table 4: District Courts’ Employee Status Test Usage by 
Circuit 
Circuit  Common Law Test
Hybrid 
Test No Test 
First Circuit 9 0 0 
Second Circuit 19 0 0 
Third Circuit 13 0 1 
Fourth Circuit 13 2 3 
Fifth Circuit 0 12 1 
Sixth Circuit 8 1 1 
Seventh Circuit 6 5 1 
Eighth Circuit 8 4 1 
Ninth Circuit 13 3 3 
Tenth Circuit 4 2 1 
Eleventh Circuit 3 10 1 
D.C. Circuit 3 2 1 
Total 99 41 14 
  Note: N=154 
 
Because the hybrid test is generally seen as more plaintiff-
friendly than the common law test, one would expect decisions 
from common law-heavy circuits to favor plaintiffs less fre-
quently.117 This is not the case in the regression results shown 
 
 116. See KENNEDY, supra note 63, at 197 (discussing dropping highly corre-
lated, or collinear, variables). 
 117. See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 7, at 114 (advocating for the economic real-
ities test over the common law test: “A liberal definition of employee status is 
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in Table 3: in the common law-heavy First, Second, and Fourth 
Circuits, as well as the mixed D.C. Circuit, variables produced 
better plaintiff win probabilities than in the Fifth. This could 
be read as further confirmation of the Restatement’s position 
that the common law and hybrid tests actually converge in re-
ality,118 seen in combination with the lack of statistical signifi-
cance of the “test” variable on its own. However, the circuit dif-
ferences observed here are likely also the result of a 
combination of unobserved factors, including perhaps the vary-
ing political ideologies and compositions of the panels that is-
sue precedential misclassification decisions.119 
Finally, two variables were negatively associated with 
plaintiff misclassification wins at a statistically significant lev-
el: the presence of a failure to hire fact pattern in the underly-
ing Title VII case and the reference to a written contract be-
tween the parties in the misclassification decision. The 
probability of a misclassification win for those plaintiffs alleg-
ing a discriminatory failure to hire decreased by 0.276 as com-
pared to those plaintiffs who made no such allegation, a drop of 
ninety percent. For those cases in which the decision referred to 
a written contract, the predicted probability of a misclassifica-
tion win decreased by 0.258, or a seventy percent drop as com-
pared with those decisions in which no reference appeared.120 
 
critical to that goal, as part of an interlocking structure that guarantees the 
broadest possible access to protection against employment discrimination. The 
economic realities test ensures that goal by focusing on the employer’s ability 
to erect arbitrary, unnecessary barriers to employment opportunities based on 
race, sex, religion or national origin. This broad test is essential to guarantee-
ing that the policies and goals of Title VII will be achieved”). 
 118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01 cmt. d–e. 
 119. See generally EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 107 (discussing 
influences on circuit judges’ decision-making). There is also the question of 
whether and how well district courts, whose decisions are studied here, actual-
ly follow circuit court guidance in deciding which legal test to employ. 
 120. Taking account of the ninety-five percent confidence intervals for both 
the failure to hire and written contract variables, we can see that the coeffi-
cient for failure to hire could range from -0.427 to -0.125 and the coefficient for 
the written contract variable could range from -0.434 to -0.083. This means 
that the misclassification win probability for plaintiffs with failure to hire 
claims could actually decrease by between 139 and 41 percent, and the win 
probability could decrease with the presence of a written contract reference by 
between 118 and 22 percent. 
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IV.  DISCUSSION   
This Part returns to the three theories summarized above 
to contextualize the regression results and make some norma-
tive critiques about courts’ processing of misclassification chal-
lenges. First, with regard to legal formalism, as the previous 
Part explained, a court’s choice of the common law or hybrid 
test did not produce a statistically significant change in a plain-
tiff ’s probability of winning a misclassification challenge. Nor 
did the variable that captured the relative misclassification 
risk in a plaintiff ’s occupation—a rough merits proxy—have a 
statistically significant impact on a plaintiff ’s win probability. 
It may be tempting to interpret these non-results as a refu-
tation of legal formalism and confirmation of critical realism, 
i.e., the position that legal rules do not matter as much as other 
factors in influencing the outcome of legal disputes.121 However, 
regression coefficients that are not statistically significant can-
not be read as such: they merely fail to prove or disprove a rela-
tionship (or lack thereof) between the independent and de-
pendent variables.122 Alternatively, these results could be seen 
as confirmation of the Restatement’s position that the two os-
tensibly separate legal tests are not actually all that differ-
ent.123 In this view, the lack of a result with respect to the “test” 
variable does not mean that courts are disregarding the law, 
but rather that the law they are applying cannot be meaning-
fully divided into “common law” and “hybrid” approaches. The 
non-result may therefore be an artifact of the lack of distinction 
between the two values that the “test” variable can take on. 
In fact, some of the other regression results suggest that 
the law may matter in ways that are consistent with legal for-
malism. The fact that plaintiffs who were represented by spe-
cialist attorneys are so much more likely to succeed in their 
misclassification challenges than pro se plaintiffs may suggest 
that attorneys can gauge the strength of a claim against some 
legal standard, and that courts do, in fact, employ that same 
legal standard in deciding wins and losses.124 
 
 121. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.3. 
 122. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 107, at 135–37 (explaining interpreta-
tion of regression non-results). 
 123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01 cmt. d–e. 
 124. See Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 178 (“The formal legal model would 
assume that the behavior of lawyers in accepting, defending, and settling cas-
es will reflect their knowledge of the law and their prediction of how a judge or 
jury would decide a case.”). 
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The lower probability of a misclassification win for plain-
tiffs with hiring discrimination claims may also support a legal 
formalist view.125 As a general matter, hiring discrimination 
claims tend to be particularly hard for plaintiffs to win. This is 
because plaintiffs who are in the position of a rejected applicant 
may lack evidence about why they were rejected (other than 
their own suspicions of discrimination) and must wait until dis-
covery to amass the statistics or other proof supporting their 
claim.126 Judges may therefore be consciously or unconsciously 
targeting discriminatory hiring claims for dismissal on the mis-
classification question, to avoid having to engage with those 
cases’ messy fact patterns later in litigation.127 The formal proof 
requirements that doom the underlying Title VII hiring claim 
may thus be casting a shadow earlier in the case to doom a 
plaintiff ’s misclassification challenge as well. 
A less tangential connection between the presence of a 
failure to hire claim in a lawsuit and a misclassification loss 
might stem from the nature of the allegations and proof that a 
worker must present in order to win the misclassification claim 
itself. Both versions of the employee status test require courts 
to consider a variety of fact-specific criteria in distinguishing 
between employees and independent contractors, including, in-
ter alia, the worker’s schedule and method of payment and the 
putative employer’s record keeping and level of control.128 When 
a worker has never been hired, he or she has no facts from 
which to draw to make a showing on these factors. Thus, the 
worker is in the position of arguing about what his or her hypo-
thetical work relationship would have looked like had he or she 
been hired. This would seem to be an exceedingly difficult task, 
making hiring discrimination cases particularly hard to win on 
the misclassification question.129 Consistent with a legal formal-
 
 125. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 126. See Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences: How Antidiscrimination 
Litigation Increases Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38 N.M. L. REV. 333, 
346 (2008) (“[I]t always has been harder for an individual to ‘prove’ that he or 
she was wrongfully passed over for a position than that he or she was wrong-
fully fired.”). 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 
(1989) (describing factors considered in the common law test); Oestman v. 
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins., 958 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1992) (describing fac-
tors considered in the hybrid common law-economic realities test). 
 129. Non-traditional employment relationships present additional concep-
tual difficulties in drawing “hiring” and “firing” lines. For example, imagine a 
worker who is labeled an independent contractor and engaged for a particular 
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ist view, the proof requirements of the law, and the plaintiff ’s 
inability to meet them, would seem to explain the plaintiff ’s 
loss.130 Thus, buried within the regression results are some le-
gal formalist hints that the law does matter to judges’ misclas-
sification decisions, though the common law-hybrid distinction 
seems to matter less than some commentators would believe.131 
Second, contractual formalist theories find support in the 
regression result regarding judges’ references to written con-
tracts: in cases with such a reference, a plaintiff ’s misclassifica-
tion win probability was seventy percent lower than in cases 
with no such reference.132 These cases, which represented just 
over one-third of the data set, were of two types: those in which 
courts cited the presence of a contract in conclusorily declaring 
the plaintiff an independent contractor, and those in which 
courts cited a contract but also engaged in a multifactor analy-
sis, ultimately ruling against the plaintiff. In an example of the 
latter, a Northern District of Indiana court stated the following: 
The best evidence of Jones’ independent contractor status is contained 
within the plain language of the Agreement itself. Jones is identified 
as, and signed the Agreement as, an independent contractor. The 
term “independent contractor” is used on numerous occasions 
throughout the [two]-page document. By signing the Agreement Jones 
acknowledged its contents and cannot now be heard to claim she 
thought she was an employee of AWS.133 
Though the court went on to consider a variety of facts about 
the parties’ underlying work relationship,134 the outcome of the 
plaintiff ’s misclassification challenge was likely predetermined 
by the court’s characterization of the parties’ written contract 
as the “best evidence of [the plaintiff ’s] independent contractor 
status.”135 
 
job. The job ends, and she is not engaged again when another job becomes 
available. Is this a termination or a failure to hire? 
 130. See Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 178 (“The outcome of a case should 
be determined by how well a plaintiff meets the formal requirements for mak-
ing and proving a claim of discrimination.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 7, at 114 (advocating for the ostensibly 
broader economic realities test over the common law test to achieve Title VII’s 
broad remedial purpose). 
 132. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 133. Jones v. A.W. Holdings, LLC, No. 109cv284 WCL, 2011 WL 488634, at 
*13–14 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2011); see also cases cited supra note 100. 
 134. Jones, 2011 WL 488634, at *13–19. 
 135. Id. at *13 (considering economic realities factors). Of course, a correla-
tion between plaintiff misclassification losses and the presence of a written 
contract does not necessarily mean that the contract caused the loss. Work re-
lationships in which a written contract was present might also feature more 
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As Julia Tomassetti has observed, courts that engage in 
this sort of reasoning, in which the existence of a written con-
tract serves a sort of talismanic purpose, are “construct[ing] the 
written work contract as an institutional marker of non-
employment, and . . . this construction is often a misleading use 
of contractual formalism.”136 Indeed, the misclassification anal-
ysis requires courts to set aside the labels that the parties as-
sign to their working relationship and instead to consider the 
facts of the relationship as it actually operated.137 Courts that 
fail to engage with this sort of analysis are employing what 
Barton Beebe has labeled in a different context “a ‘fast and fru-
gal’ heuristic[] to short-circuit the multifactor analysis” re-
quired by either the common law or hybrid approach.138 
The upshot of courts’ reliance on written contracts is that 
they functionally cede the power to define the parties’ relation-
ship to the parties themselves. This is troubling on a practical 
level because of the possibility of sham contracts that are not 
bilateral at all; workers may sign them not because they intend 
to create an independent contractor relationship, but because 
they fear losing their job if they refuse.139 Such a sham contract 
 
indicia of independence on the part of the worker. However, in cases like 
Jones, causation appears more likely, as the court expressly characterized the 
contract as the “best evidence” of the worker’s status. 
 136. Tomassetti, supra note 6, at 1114; see also Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (criticizing contractual formalism for 
viewing “the precise word was the sovereign talisman”). 
 137. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 138. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trade-
mark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1581 (2006) (discussing judges’ 
shortcuts in the context of multifactor trademark infringement analyses). 
Thanks to Robert Bird for this insight. 
 139. See Russell v. BSN Med., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474 (W.D.N.C. 
2010) (describing a worker who was pressured to sign a contract labeling her 
an independent contractor and “was told multiple times she would be fired if 
she did not sign the Agreement by a specific date”; noting the employer’s “ob-
vious incentive from a legal liability standpoint to memorialize in writing that 
Russell was an independent contractor rather than an employee”); Peeples v. 
Prestige Delivery Sys., Inc., Civil Action No. 11-2373, 2011 WL 6303246, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2011) (dismissing the plaintiff ’s Title VII claims on the 
ground that he had signed an “Independent Contractor Operating Agreement,” 
despite evidence that “Plaintiff [had been] compelled to sign the 2006 agree-
ment without the opportunity to negotiate its terms and without the benefit of 
legal counsel”); Payroll Fraud Hearing, supra note 29, at 4 (statement of 
Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, National Employment Law Project) (“When job op-
portunities are scarce, workers face increased pressure to acquiesce to inde-
pendent contractor arrangements. An Ohio worker who agreed in 2010 to be 
labeled an independent contractor as a condition of getting a job building 
housing for the homeless under a federal grant explained, ‘I went along with it 
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then becomes indistinguishable from the employer-imposed 
unilateral “independent contractor” label that courts are so 
quick to reject.140 
On a more theoretical level, courts’ reliance on the exist-
ence of a written contract between the parties to short-circuit 
the misclassification inquiry threatens to undermine the non-
waiver principle that is the bedrock of employment law.141 As 
Cynthia Estlund explains, “[M]ost employee rights—such as 
the right to be paid a minimum wage or to be free from discrim-
ination—cannot be waived ex ante.”142 Estlund comments that, 
due to the variety of mandates and prohibitions imposed by 
employment and labor statutes, “[t]he vast and varied domain 
of employee rights has made the employment relationship as 
much a creature of public law as of private law.”143 Public law 
statutes like Title VII therefore create a set of inalienable em-
ployment rights, which workers cannot waive and employers 
cannot contract around, even with a willing partner.144 Courts 
 
because I felt my back was up against the wall. I have a family. My fiance [sic] 
was in school. I’m the only bread winner.’”). 
 140. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 141. Thanks to comments by Noah Zatz for prompting this thought. 
 142. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agree-
ments and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 388 n.19 (2006) (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1981)) recognizing that the Fair La-
bor Standards Act’s protections against substandard wages and oppressive 
conditions “cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived”); Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (“[T]here can be no prospective 
waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”). 
 143. Estlund, supra note 142, at 387. 
 144. See Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 
116 (2d Cir. 2000) (“While the rights to intellectual property can depend on 
contractual terms, the right to be treated in a non-discriminatory manner does 
not depend on the terms of any particular contract. Rather, these ‘public law’ 
rights were vested in workers as a class by Congress, and they are not subject 
to waiver or sale by individuals.” (citation omitted)); Yu v. N.Y.C. Hous. Dev. 
Corp. (HDC), No. 07 Civ. 5541(GBD)(MHD), 2011 WL 2326892, at *28 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011) (“[D]efendants’ argument that plaintiff ’s employment 
status was agreed upon in the Consulting Agreement is without merit. . . . 
Employers cannot simply contract their way around the antidiscrimination 
laws, since these laws create rights that ‘are not subject to waiver or sale.’ 
Thus, ‘employment contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify 
their execution or what the terms, may not be used to waive protections grant-
ed to an individual under [Title VII] or any other [A]ct of Congress.’” (quoting 
Eisenberg, 237 F.3d at 116–17)); cf. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (1972) (discussing inalienability in property 
rights); Michael C. Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the 
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in misclassification cases whose decisions are predetermined by 
the existence of a written contract make inroads on inalienabil-
ity, allowing the parties to enact a prospective super-waiver not 
only of their Title VII rights, but also of the great majority of all 
other federal labor and employment rights whose coverage 
turns on employee status.145 
Third, the regression results neither fully corroborate nor 
contradict the critical realist position that the parties’ social 
status is an important predictor of success in litigation. The re-
gression yielded no statistically significant results for the 
white-collar plaintiff occupation variable, for instance, one that 
might predict plaintiff success in a critical realist world. Nor 
were plaintiffs who brought disfavored race and national origin 
discrimination claims less successful on the misclassification 
question, at a statistically significant level, than those who 
made other types of discrimination allegation. Nor did plaintiffs 
who held jobs associated heavily with women or people of color 
fare worse than other workers.146 
However, the striking success of specialist-represented 
plaintiffs, interpreted above as possible support for the legal 
formalist position that high-merit cases win more often, could 
also be interpreted as support for the critical realist position 
that more socially powerful plaintiffs win more often. As Niel-
sen et al. put it, the assumption is that more socially powerful 
and wealthier plaintiffs “will convert these social resources into 
legal resources” such as specialist attorneys.147 
Yet the real confirmation for the critical realist position 
might not be found by examining the results of cases that are 
actually filed in court. As Part II.C above explored in its discus-
sion of selection effects, critical realism could be deployed to 
explain the slippage between the categories of misclassified 
workers who are most likely to experience discrimination and 
those plaintiffs who actually file Title VII cases and challenge 
their independent contractor status. That the workers in the 
 
NLRA: Part I, 4 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335 (1981) (discussing inaliena-
ble rights in labor law); Michael L. Wachter, The Law and Economics of Col-
lective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Sub-
contracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1368 
(1988) (same). 
 145. See Eisenberg, 237 F.3d at 116–17; Yu, 2011 WL 2326892, at *28. 
 146. The fact that there were no statistically significant results with re-
spect to these variables does not mean that no relationship exists as a matter 
of fact, just that none can be discerned from these data. 
 147. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 180. 
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former category tend to hold lower wage, bluer-collar jobs than 
the plaintiffs in the latter would be no surprise to the critical 
realist. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article has asked two questions. First, to what extent 
is misclassification removing Title VII coverage from workers 
who are otherwise likely to become antidiscrimination plain-
tiffs? Second, how are courts resolving Title VII misclassifica-
tion disputes, acting to bring workers back into the statute’s 
ambit? 
From the foregoing analyses, we can suggest some tenta-
tive answers. First, misclassification appears to be both gen-
dered and raced, pulling disproportionate numbers of women 
and workers of color out of Title VII’s coverage. Of the eight oc-
cupations that are most at risk for misclassification and con-
tribute the most misclassified workers to the economy, women 
and/or people of color are overrepresented in seven. And women 
of color are overrepresented in four: hairdressers, maids and 
housekeepers, teacher assistants, and door-to-door sales work-
ers and street vendors. This suggests that misclassification 
may be undermining the protections offered by Title VII by re-
moving workers from the statute’s reach. Second, the workers 
who turn to the courts to challenge their improper classification 
and gain access to Title VII are a different group from those 
just described. Consistent with previous research and with the 
critical realist perspective, the workers who use the courts are 
generally better paid and thus more socially privileged than the 
larger population of potential Title VII plaintiffs who are mis-
classified. These results raise serious, though far from novel, 
questions about access to justice. 
Third, even those workers who use the courts do not fare 
very well, as two-thirds lose their misclassification challenges. 
And fourth, misclassification losses are unevenly distributed, 
as specialist attorney representation and circuit location pre-
dict greater plaintiff misclassification win probabilities; under-
lying hiring discrimination allegations and judges’ references to 
written contracts predict lower win probabilities. This final 
finding is particularly interesting, and troubling, given its im-
plications for the inalienability of employment rights. 
These conclusions highlight multiple areas in which fur-
ther study is needed. Specifically, this Article has set aside the 
two central questions of why misclassification occurs in the oc-
  
958 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:907 
 
cupations identified in the Roemer research, and why gender 
and race distributions occur as they do among those high mis-
classification occupations. Solving those riddles would help in 
constructing solutions to the misclassification problems identi-
fied here. 
  APPENDIX   
Table 5: Occupations Most at Risk for Misclassification, 
as Measured by CPS-DER Mismatch Rate (Numbers in 
Thousands)148 
Occupation 
Total  
Workers in 
Occupation 
Misclassified 
Workers in 
Occupation 
Percent of 
Workers 
Misclassified 
Real estate brokers and sales 
agents 1,027 450 43.8 
Barbers 79 26 32.9 
Fishers and related fishing 
workers 78 22 28.2 
Miscellaneous social scien-
tists and related workers 37 9 24.3 
Clergy 953 217 22.8 
Dentists 163 37 22.7 
Maids and housekeeping 
cleaners 919 160 17.4 
Childcare workers 482 76 15.8 
Carpet, floor, and tile in-
stallers and finishers 312 43 13.8 
Hairdressers, hairstylists, 
and cosmetologists 1,287 175 13.6 
Lawyers  1,488 185 12.4 
Judges, magistrates, and 
other judicial workers 1,488 185 12.4 
Door-to-door sales workers, 
news and street vendors, and 
related workers 
782 82 10.5 
Teacher assistants 1,176 115 9.8 
Farmers, ranchers, and other 
agricultural managers 444 43 9.7 
Management analysts 480 45 9.4 
Musicians, singers, and re-
lated workers 259 24 9.3 
Insurance sales agents 1,345 115 8.6 
 
 148. ROEMER, supra note 26. 
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Occupation 
Total  
Workers in 
Occupation 
Misclassified 
Workers in 
Occupation 
Percent of 
Workers 
Misclassified 
Securities, commodities, and 
financial services sales 
agents 
874 74 8.5 
Taxi drivers and chauffeurs 422 35 8.3 
Court, municipal, and license 
clerks 194 15 7.7 
Artists and related workers 234 15 6.4 
Carpenters 2,801 164 5.9 
Psychologists 553 31 5.6 
Physicians and surgeons 1,444 79 5.5 
Photographers 276 15 5.4 
Construction laborers 2,361 128 5.4 
Advertising sales agents 359 18 5.0 
Designers 1,305 59 4.5 
Roofers 481 20 4.2 
Property, real estate, and 
community association man-
agers 
764 30 3.9 
First-line supervisors of con-
struction trades and extrac-
tion workers 
1,412 55 3.9 
Painters, construction and 
maintenance 1,101 42 3.8 
Grounds maintenance work-
ers 2,290 78 3.4 
Driver/sales workers and 
truck drivers 7,636 241 3.2 
Sales representatives, 
wholesale and manufactur-
ing 
4,084 121 3.0 
Sales representatives, ser-
vices, all other 1,614 47 2.9 
Miscellaneous agricultural 
workers 2,522 69 2.7 
Automotive service techni-
cians and mechanics 2,134 55 2.6 
Marketing and sales manag-
ers 10,750 226 2.1 
Notes: All occupations listed had CPS-DER mismatch likelihood ratios of 
at least one percent, per Roemer. Mismatch percentages, rather than like-
lihood ratios, are reported here, due to the difficulty of reverse-
engineering Roemer’s table without access to the underlying data. Occu-
pation names listed here have been converted to their closest equivalent 
among the standardized occupations used in Bureau of Labor Statistics 
data. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics: Categorical Variables 
Variable Frequency Percent 
Misclassification win for plaintiff 53 34.42 
Misclassification loss for plaintiff 101 65.58 
Misclassification win cases only:    
Title VII win for plaintiff 3 5.66 
Title VII settlement  34 64.15 
Title VII loss for plaintiff 12 22.64 
Case still open 4 7.55 
All cases:   
Title VII win for plaintiff 3 1.95 
Title VII settlement  34 22.08 
Title VII loss for plaintiff 113 73.38 
Case still open 4 2.60 
Pro se plaintiff 53 34.42 
Non-specialist attorney representation 45 29.22 
Specialist attorney representation 56 36.36 
Blue-collar plaintiff occupation 50 32.47 
White-collar plaintiff occupation 104 67.53 
Overlap occupations:   
Judges, magistrates, and other judicial work-
ers 1 0.65 
Clergy 1 0.65 
Real estate brokers and sales agents 3 1.95 
Hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists 0 0.00 
Teacher assistants 0 0.00 
Door-to-door sales workers, news and street 
vendors, and related workers 3 1.95 
Maids and housekeeping cleaners 0 0.00 
Defendant industry:   
Trucking, construction, maintenance 24 15.58 
Retail 7 4.55 
Manufacturing, agriculture 8 5.19 
Package delivery 7 4.55 
School, university 10 6.49 
Medical, health, social services 28 18.18 
Media, entertainment 11 7.14 
Government 26 16.88 
Financial services, insurance, other profes-
sional services 33 21.43 
Race discrimination claim in case 68 44.16 
No race discrimination claim in case 86 55.84 
Sex discrimination claim in case 82 53.25 
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Variable Frequency Percent 
No sex discrimination claim in case 72 46.75 
Any other discrimination claim in case: 35 77.27 
Religious discrimination claim in case 15 9.74 
No religious discrimination claim in case 139 90.26 
National origin discrimination claim in case 23 14.94 
No national origin discrimination claim in 
case 131 85.06 
Color discrimination claim in case 7 4.55 
No color discrimination claim in case 147 95.45 
No other discrimination claim in case  119 77.27 
Retaliation claim in case 75 48.70 
No retaliation claim in case 79 51.30 
Failure to hire fact pattern in case 15 9.74 
No failure to hire fact pattern in case 139 90.26 
Termination fact pattern in case 83 53.90 
No termination fact pattern in case 71 46.10 
Harassment/discriminatory conditions claim in case 74 48.05 
No harassment/discriminatory conditions claim in case 80 51.95 
Democrat-appointed judge 60 38.96 
Republican-appointed judge 94 61.04 
Common law agency test 99 64.29 
Hybrid test 41 26.62 
No test 14 9.09 
Reference to written contract in case 52 33.77 
No reference to written contract in case 102 66.23 
First Circuit 9 5.84 
Second Circuit 19 12.34 
Third Circuit 14 9.09 
Fourth Circuit 18 11.69 
Fifth Circuit 13 8.44 
Sixth Circuit 10 6.49 
Seventh Circuit 12 7.79 
Eighth Circuit 13 8.44 
Ninth Circuit 19 12.34 
Tenth Circuit 7 4.55 
Eleventh Circuit 14 9.09 
D.C. Circuit 6 3.90 
2005 9 5.84 
2006 12 7.79 
2007 10 6.49 
2008 9 5.84 
2009 18 11.69 
2010 25 16.23 
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Variable Frequency Percent 
2011 18 11.69 
2012 22 14.29 
2013 14 9.09 
2014 17 11.04 
 
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics: Continuous Variables 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Percent of workers 
misclassified in  
occupation  
0.0 43.8 3.9 0.0 7.01 
Number of workers 
misclassified in  
occupation 
(in thousands) 
0.0 450.0 59.3 0.0 99.9 
Percent of workers 
in occupation:  
women 
0.0 22.0 3.7 4.0 3.46 
Percent of workers 
in occupation: Black 
or African American 
0.0 3.0 0.4 0.0 0.57 
Percent of workers 
in occupation: Asian 0.0 2.0 0.4 0.0 0.74 
Percent of workers 
in occupation:  
Hispanic or Latino 
0.0 5.0 0.9 1.0 0.93 
 
